Juan Perón

Following President Ramírez's January 1944 suspension of diplomatic relations with the Axis powers (against whom the new junta would declare war in March 1945), the GOU junta unseated him in favor of General Edelmiro Farrell. For contributing to his success, Perón was appointed vice president and Secretary of War, while retaining his Labour portfolio. As Minister of Labour, Perón established the INPS (the first national social insurance system in Argentina), settled industrial disputes in favour of labour unions (as long as their leaders pledged political allegiance to him), and introduced a wide range of social welfare benefits for unionised workers.

Employers were forced to improve working conditions and to provide severance pay and accident compensation, the conditions under which workers could be dismissed were restricted, a system of labour courts to handle the grievances of workers was established, the working day was reduced in various industries, and paid holidays/vacations were generalised to the entire workforce. Perón also passed a law providing minimum wages, maximum hours and vacations for rural workers, froze rural rents, presided over a large increase in rural wages, and helped lumber, wine, sugar and migrant workers organize themselves. From 1943 to 1946, real wages grew by only 4%, but in 1945 Perón established two new institutions that would later increase wages: the "aguinaldo" (a bonus that provided each worker with a lump sum at the end of the year amounting to one-twelfth of the annual wage) and the National Institute of Compensation, which implemented a minimum wage and collected data on living standards, prices, and wages. Leveraging his authority on behalf of striking abattoir workers and the right to unionise, Perón became increasingly thought of as a presidential candidate.

On 18 September 1945, he delivered an address billed as "from work to home and from home to work". The speech, prefaced by an excoriation of the conservative opposition, provoked an ovation by declaring that "we've passed social reforms to make the Argentine people proud to live where they live, once again." This move fed growing rivalries against Perón and on 9 October 1945, he was forced to resign by opponents within the armed forces. Arrested four days later, he was released due to mass demonstrations organised by the CGT and other supporters; 17 October was later commemorated as Loyalty Day. His paramour, Eva Duarte, became hugely popular after helping organize the demonstration; known as "Evita", she helped Perón gain support with labour and women's groups. She and Perón were married on 22 October.

During the first half of the 20th century, a widening gap had existed between the classes; Perón hoped to close it through the increase of wages and employment, making the nation more pluralistic and less reliant on foreign trade. Before taking office in 1946, President Perón took dramatic steps which he believed would result in a more economically independent Argentina, better insulated from events such as World War II. He thought there would be another international war. The reduced availability of imports and the war's beneficial effects on both the quantity and price of Argentine exports had combined to create a US$1.7 billion cumulative surplus during those years.

In his first two years in office, Perón nationalized the Central Bank and paid off its billion-dollar debt to the Bank of England; nationalized the railways (mostly owned by British and French companies), merchant marine, universities, public utilities, public transport (then, mostly tramways); and, probably most significantly, created a single purchaser for the nation's mostly export-oriented grains and oilseeds, the Institute for the Promotion of Trade (IAPI). The IAPI wrested control of Argentina's famed grain export sector from entrenched conglomerates such as Bunge y Born; but when commodity prices fell after 1948, it began shortchanging growers. IAPI profits were used to fund welfare projects, while internal demand was encouraged by large wage increases given to workers; average real wages rose by about 35% from 1945 to 1949, while during that same period, labour's share of national income rose from 40% to 49%. Access to healthcare was also made a universal right by the Workers' Bill of Rights enacted on 24 February 1947 (subsequently incorporated into the 1949 Constitution as Article 14-b), while social security was extended to virtually all members of the Argentine working class. Various labor laws were also passed during the course of Perón's presidency.

From 1946 to 1951, the number of Argentinians covered by social security more than tripled, so that in 1951 more than 5 million people (70% of the economically active population) were covered by social security. Health insurance also spread to new industries, including banking and metalworking. Between 1945 and 1949, real wages went up by 22%, fell between 1949 and 1952, and then increased again from 1953 to 1955, ending up at least 30% higher than in 1946. In proportional terms, wages rose from 41% of national income in 1946–48 to 49% in 1952–55. The boost in the real incomes of workers was encouraged by government policies such as the enforcement of minimum wage laws, controls on the prices of food and other basic consumption items and extending housing credits to workers.

Exports fell sharply, to around US$1.1 billion during the 1949–54 era (a severe 1952 drought trimmed this to US$700 million), due in part to a deterioration in terms of trade of about a third. The Central Bank was forced to devalue the peso at an unprecedented rate: the peso lost about 70% of its value from early 1948 to early 1950, leading to a decline in imports fueling industrial growth and to recession. Short of central bank reserves, Perón was forced to borrow US$125 million from the U.S. Export-Import Bank to cover a number of private banks' debts to U.S. institutions, without which their insolvency would have become a central bank liability. Austerity and better harvests in 1950 helped finance a recovery in 1951; but inflation, having risen from 13% in 1948 to 31% in 1949, reached 50% in late 1951 before stabilizing, and a second, sharper recession soon followed. Workers' purchasing power, by 1952, had declined 20% from its 1948 high and GDP, having leapt by a fourth during Perón's first two years, saw zero growth from 1948 to 1952. After 1952, however, wages began rising in real terms once more.

The growing frequency of strikes, increasingly directed against Perón as the economy slid into stagflation in late 1954, was dealt with through the expulsion of organizers from the CGT ranks. To consolidate his political grasp on the eve of colder economic winds, Perón called for broad constitutional reform in September. The elected convention (whose opposition members soon resigned) approved the wholesale replacement of the 1853 Constitution of Argentina with a new magna carta in March, explicitly guaranteeing social reforms; but also allowing the mass nationalization of natural resources and public services, as well as the re-election of the president.

Perón modernized the Argentine Armed Forces, particularly its Air Force. Between 1947 and 1950, Argentina manufactured two advanced jet aircraft: Pulqui I (designed by the Argentine engineers Cardehilac, Morchio and Ricciardi with the French engineer Émile Dewoitine, condemned in France in absentia for collaborationism), and Pulqui II, designed by German engineer Kurt Tank. In the test flights, the planes were flown by Lieutenant Edmundo Osvaldo Weiss and Tank, reaching 1,000 km/h (620 mph) with the Pulqui II. Argentina continued testing the Pulqui II until 1959; in the tests, two pilots lost their lives. The Pulqui project opened the door to two successful Argentinian planes: the IA 58 Pucará and the IA 63 Pampa, manufactured at the Aircraft Factory of Córdoba.

Perón announced in 1951 that the Huemul Project would produce nuclear fusion before any other country. The project was led by an Austrian, Ronald Richter, who had been recommended by Kurt Tank. Tank expected to power his aircraft with Richter's invention. Perón announced that energy produced by the fusion process would be delivered in milk-bottle sized containers. Richter announced success in 1951, but no proof was given. The next year, Perón appointed a scientific team to investigate Richter's activities. Reports by José Antonio Balseiro and Mario Báncora revealed that the project was a fraud. After that, the Huemul Project was transferred to the Centro Atómico Bariloche (CAB) of the new National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) and to the physics institute of the Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, later named Instituto Balseiro (IB). According to a recently aired History Channel documentary, the secrecy, Nazi connections, declassified US intelligence documents, and military infrastructure located around the remote facility all argue for the more likely objective of atomic bomb development. The Argentine navy actually bombed multiple buildings in 1955 – an unusual method of decommissioning a legitimate research facility.

The populist leader was intolerant of both left-wing and conservative opposition. Though he used violence, Perón preferred to deprive the opposition of their access to media. Interior Minister Borlenghi administered El Laborista, the leading official news daily. Carlos Aloe, a personal friend of Evita's, oversaw an array of leisure magazines published by Editorial Haynes, which the Peronist Party bought a majority stake in. Through the Secretary of the Media, Raúl Apold, socialist dailies such as La Vanguardia or Democracia, and conservative ones such as La Prensa or La Razón, were simply closed or expropriated in favor of the CGT or ALEA, the regime's new state media company. Intimidation of the press increased: between 1943 and 1946, 110 publications were closed down; others such as La Nación and Roberto Noble's Clarín became more cautious and self-censoring. Perón appeared more threatened by dissident artists than by opposition political figures (though UCR leader Ricardo Balbín spent most of 1950 in jail). Numerous prominent cultural and intellectual figures were imprisoned (publisher and critic Victoria Ocampo, for one) or forced into exile, among them comedian Niní Marshall, film maker Luis Saslavsky, pianist Osvaldo Pugliese and actress Libertad Lamarque, victim of a rivalry with Eva Perón.

Summarizing the academic consensus on Peronism, Arnd Schneider wrote that "most authors, analysing the phenomenon in retrospect agree that the term Fascism does not accurately describe Peronism." Among others, scholars who argue that Peronism was neither fascist nor fascist-aligned include the historian Federico Finchelstein, philosopher Donald C. Hodges, and historian Daniel James. Argentine historian Cristian Buchrucker outlines main reasons why Peronism cannot be characterized fascist:

Peronism developed in the early and mid 1940s during a period of economic growth - unlike Italian Fascism and German Nazism, which developed at a time of economic crisis;

when Perón became Labour Secretary in 1943 and started to implement the first elements of his ideology, it did not mark the end of democracy (as in 1922's Italy and 1933's Germany). Rather, Perón succeeded the Infamous Decade, which had already seen prolonged military rule and authoritarian conservative governments, "thinly legitimized by fraudulent elections";

Peronism was based primarily on the urban and urbanized rural working class. In contrast, the appeal of Italian Fascism and German Nazism was to the middle classes who were disillusioned with a lost World War I and economic crisis;

while the societies of Italy, Germany and Argentina all perceived a threat of communism, only Italy and Germany had strong left-wing movements; Argentina lacked a strong left-wing movement, as socialist parties "had long been suppressed and ceased to play any tangible role", and "the working class, and the new urban poor, were without a real organizational voice" before Perón;

the virulent, fascist territorial expansionism of Italy and Germany was absent in Peronism;

unlike fascism, Peronism was an authoritarian, not a totalitarian political system, as Argentina never became a one-party state.

Goran Petrovic Lotina and Théo Aiolfi wrote that "Peronism was never a form of fascism during Juan Perón's first presidencies (1946–1955). Nor was Peronism fascistic in its subsequent incarnations over the past seventy-five years from the 1970s revolutionary leftist Montonero guerilla organization to the neoliberal centre-right presidency of Carlos Menem." Hodges remarked that it is a "cheap academic trick to lump together fascism (...) and Peronism". According to Hodges, Perón embraced the concept of the state as the juridical instrument that can only function within and serve the nation, but rejected the organic notions of the state assuming the dominating role by organizing the nation. Perón also prided himself in his doctrinal flexibility and elasticity, and agreed with national syndicalism of Primo de Rivera in principle, although he ultimately pursued a different political path. Hodges argues that "In view of both its gradualism and its concern for striking a balance between extremes, justicialism has more in common with the American New Deal than with either Italian fascism or German national socialism." Daniel James believes that the neo-corporatism of Peronism cannot be explained by any allegiance to fascist ideas, arguing that Perón "took his ideas principally from social catholic, communitarian ideologues rather than from any pre-1955 fascistic theory." As a response to Carlos Fayt who characterized Perónism as fascist, James P. Brennan wrote:

A close study of Peronist ideology, however, shows that the differences between it and fascism are greater than their few similarities. The central components of Justicialismo — that is, of Peronist ideology — have roots in the Social Christianism and national populism of the FORJA (the yrigoyenista, the nationalist youth wing of the Radical Party in the 1930s), and in syndicalism. Moreover, this synthesis proved to be more resilient over time than many had assumed. In Peronism's formative stage, the irrational vitalisme ("life" philosophy) and Social Darwinism of fascism had minimal and no influence, respectively. With regard to Italian corporatism, which ended up replacing the unions and democratic elections, it cannot be seriously compared with the syndicalist element in Peronism. Peronism's presumedly expansionist goals likewise are nowhere in evidence, and Sebreli's thesis does not stand up to the slightest analysis. The only similarity that can be acknowledged is the particular importance both ideologies granted to the concept of the leader. [...]

Whereas Italian fascism and German nazism destroyed the universal suffrage that had existed in those countries, Peronism on the other hand put an end to the systematic electoral fraud that had been practiced in Argentina between 1932 and 1943. There was no militarization of society, nor was public spending directed toward a massive arms buildup. Economic policy was dirigiste, but if state planning is an indicator of fascism, one would have to conclude that Mexico under Cardenas and Great Britain under the Labour governments. The Peronist governments of 1946-1955 and 1973-1976 directed their efforts toward distributive and industrializing policies.

According to Pablo Bradbury, while there was a great divergence between formal Peronist ideology and the wider Peronist movement, the ideology of Perón was not fascist; Bradbury argues that nationalism of Peronism was not rooted in a sense of expansion or imperialist greatness, but was left-wing nationalism that "found its most prominent expressions in anti-imperialism, whether against British economic dominance or US political interference." He also remarked that "Peronism originated in a military dictatorship, but established a populist authoritarian democracy". The democratizing movement within Peronism was significant, as it empowered previously marginalized groups – Peronism introduced universal suffrage and reshaped the definition of Argentinian citizenship and national identity. Bradbury also points to the racist rhetoric of middle-class and upper-class opponents of Peronism, who called Peronists cabecitas negras ("little black heads"), portraying the Peronist masses as prone to criminality, unsophisticated, dark-skinned and of immigrant background.

Michael Goebel likewise points to the inclusive character of Peronism that conflicted with the exclusive nature of fascism – non-Spanish surnames were far more prevalent amongst the Peronist leadership than among any other political movement in Argentina, and "even in the more marginal provinces, Peronist politicians often had rather recent immigrant origins." Cas Mudde stated that "it is not an exaggeration to state that [Perón's] populism in general propelled democracy forward, both by encouraging democratic behavior and by enrolling lower class groups and their quest for social justice in political life."

In 1938, Perón was sent on a diplomatic mission to Europe. During this time, he became enamoured of the Italian fascist model. Perón's admiration for Benito Mussolini is well documented. He credited both Italian fascism and German national socialism for creating a command economy that "harmonized the interests of workers", and his exact words in that respect were as follows:

From Germany I went back to Italy and studied the matter. My knowledge of Italian enabled me, I would say, to penetrate deeply into the foundations of the system, and that is how I discovered something which from that social point of view was very interesting to me. Italian fascism brought the popular organisations into effective participation in national life, from which the people had always been excluded. Until Mussolini's rise to power, the nation was on one side and the worker on the other, and the latter had no part in it. I discovered the resurgence of the corporations and studied them in depth.

However, Perón also cautioned that only some elements of European fascism can be praised, as the Italian and German regimes otherwise led to "administrative centralization carried to the extreme; the absorption of all private or semiprivate entities (cultural association, universities, etc.); absolute militarism; a closed and directed economy." Robert D. Classweller argued: "Peronism was not fascism. Some of Peronism's adherents had a fascist outlook and mentality. Perón himself admired Mussolini and the idea of the corporate state. But all this was relatively superficial. No fascist society was ever erected on a mass base of laboring and dispossessed hordes. In its own descriptions of identity, Peronism rejected the Fascist parallel. It was more intimately grounded in the national history and ethos than was any European fascism. The structure of the Peronist state after the constitutional amendments of 1949 remained that of the old Argentine democratic order."

Perón subverted freedom of speech and silenced vocal dissidents through actions such as nationalizing the broadcasting system and monopolizing the supply of newspaper print. At times, Perón also resorted to tactics such as imprisoning opposition politicians and journalists, including Radical Civic Union leader Ricardo Balbín; and shutting down opposition papers, such as La Prensa.

However, most scholars argue against seeing Peronism as dictatorial or totalitarian. Crassweller wrote on Peronism: "Peronism was not a dictatorship. As the American embassy stated in April 1948, ". . . Peron is far from being a dictator in the sense of having absolute authority." The army concerned itself with foreign policy. Totalitarian methods frequently appeared in the operations of the police, or in repression of the press, or in restrictions imposed on the conduct of opposition, but this falls short of a dictatorship. Perón often had to bargain for support, to trim his sails on the timing of initiatives, and to balance interests that could not be overridden. Strong and authoritarian and sometimes oppressive, yes. But not really dictatorial." Paul Corner and Jie-Hyun Lim similarly argued: "Peronism (like early Cold War populism as a whole) was not a dictatorship but an authoritarian form of democracy." Paola Raffaelli wrote: "Although some authors suggest that Peronism was a form of fascism, this was not the case. He was democratically elected and other parties and the Parliament were not banned, it did not pursue an ideology apart from a less-dependant nation, and Perón was in power three times for ten years within a twenty-eight years period of time."

Some historians also note that accusations of fascism against Perón originated from Anglo-American circles, who saw Peronism as a threat to their interests in Argentina. Pablo Aguirre argued: "Traditionally Britain in general and the Labour Party in particular have taken little interest in the affairs of Latin America. For years after the Second World War the continent was strictly terra incognita. Analysis based on ignorance was often faulty. General Peron, for example, who "stole" Britain's railways and increased the price of "British" beef, was regarded as the reincarnation of Mussolini." Judith Alder Hellman also noted that those who accused Perón of fascism tend to equate communism and fascism as similar or identical ideologies - Spruille Braden, the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs of the United States who spearheaded a campaign to portray Peronism as a fascist movement, later "frankly admitted that he could never see the difference between Fascism and Communism".

Many members of the notorious Croatian Ustaše (including their leader, Ante Pavelić) took refuge in Argentina, as did Milan Stojadinović, the former Serbian Prime Minister of monarchist Yugoslavia. In 1946 Stojadinović went to Rio de Janeiro, and then to Buenos Aires, where he was reunited with his family. Stojadinović spent the rest of his life as presidential advisor on economic and financial affairs to governments in Argentina and founded the financial newspaper El Economista in 1951, which still carries his name on its masthead.

A Croatian priest, Krunoslav Draganović, organizer of the San Girolamo ratline, was authorized by Perón to assist Nazi operatives to come to Argentina and evade prosecution in Europe after World War II, in particular the Ustaše. Ante Pavelić became a security advisor of Perón. After Perón was overthrown in 1955, Pavelić, fearing extradition to Yugoslavia, left for Francoist Spain in 1957.

As in the United States (Operation Paperclip), Argentina also welcomed displaced German scientists such as Kurt Tank and Ronald Richter. Some of these refugees took important roles in Perón's Argentina, such as French collaborationist Jacques de Mahieu, who became an ideologue of the Peronist movement, before becoming mentor to a Roman Catholic nationalist youth group in the 1960s. Belgian collaborationist Pierre Daye became editor of a Peronist magazine. Rodolfo Freude, Ludwig's son, became Perón's chief of presidential intelligence in his first term.

Recently, Goñi's research, drawing on investigations in Argentine, Swiss, American, British and Belgian government archives, as well as numerous interviews and other sources, was detailed in The Real ODESSA: Smuggling the Nazis to Perón's Argentina (2002), showing how escape routes known as ratlines were used by former NSDAP members and like-minded people to escape trial and judgment. Goñi places particular emphasis on the part played by Perón's government in organizing the ratlines, as well as documenting the aid of Swiss and Vatican authorities in their flight. The Argentine consulate in Barcelona gave false passports to fleeing Nazi war criminals and collaborationists. Recently declassified files from Brazil and Chile reveal that during WWII Péron sold 10,000 blank Argentine passports to ODESSA – the organisation set up to protect former SS men in the event of defeat.

Tomás Eloy Martínez, writer and professor of Latin American studies at Rutgers University, wrote that Juan Perón allowed Nazis into the country in hopes of acquiring advanced German technology developed during the war. Martínez also noted that Eva Perón played no part in allowing Nazis into the country. However, one of Eva's bodyguards was in fact an ex-Nazi commando named Otto Skorzeny, who had met Juan on occasion.

Perón's biographer Jill Hedges wrote on Perón's attitude and actions regarding the Nazi immigration to Argentina:

Unquestionably the Perón government, like others elsewhere, received former Nazis after the war, not least in a bid to attract skilled scientists and technicians; Perón himself would describe this as 'good business', saying 'what costs us a plane ticket cost Germany millions of marks invested in training those scientists and technicians'. Many also found their way to Argentina through the offices of the Vatican and, in some cases, through the willingness of some Argentine diplomats in Europe to sell them Argentine passports. Later investigations in the 1990s would identify 180 Nazis and collaborators who entered Argentina after the war, of whom around 50 were identified as war criminals, notably including Adolf Eichmann and Josef Mengele (with whom Perón had at least one conversation about his genetic experiments). This represented indifference rather than Nazi ideology on Perón or the government's part.

Argentina signed a generous commercial agreement with Israel that granted favourable terms for Israeli acquisitions of Argentine commodities, and the Eva Perón Foundation sent significant humanitarian aid. In 1951 during their visit to Buenos Aires, Chaim Weizmann and Golda Meir expressed their gratitude for this aid.

U.S. Ambassador George S. Messersmith visited Argentina in 1947 during the first term of Juan Perón. Messersmith noted, "There is not as much social discrimination against Jews here as there is right in New York or in most places at home..." According to Raanan Rein, "Fewer anti-Semitic incidences took place in Argentina during Perón's rule than during any other period in the 20th century."

There have been many heroic revolutionary feats on the part of military men in the twentieth century. Juan Domingo Perón, in Argentina, was also from a military background. (...) Perón made some mistakes: he offended the Argentine oligarchy, humiliated it - he nationalized its theatre and other symbols of the wealthy class - but the oligarchy's political and economic power remained intact, and at the right moment it brought Peron down, with the complicity and aid of the United States. Perón's greatness lay in the fact that he appealed to that rich country's reserves and resources and did all he could to improve the living conditions of the workers. That social class, which was always grateful and loyal to him, made Perón an idol, to the end of his life.

Perón was also regarded positively by Mao Zedong. When visiting pro-Perón Maoist militias in Argentina, Mao reportedly stated: "If I were a young Argentinian, I would be a Peronist." This quote was promoted by the Revolutionary Communist Party of Argentina, who advertized their movement by stating: "If Mao had been Argentine, he would have been a Peronist." Perón responded in kind, writing that "Marxism is not only not in contradiction with the Peronist Movement, but complements it." Perón also argued in his speech from 12 November 1972: "We must not be frightened by the word socialism". Perón stated that "if he had been Chinese he would be a Maoist", and on his trip to Communist Romania he concluded that "the regime in that country is similar, in many respects, to Justicialism".

Perón variously described his ideology as justicialism or socialismo nacional cristiano - "Christian national socialism", which Perón used as an unclear term that he used to discuss diverse government systems that in his belief corresponded to the will of the people while also considering the unique circumstances and culture of each nation. According to Richard Gillespie, this expression meant to convey "a 'national' road to socialism, understood as a system of economic socialization and popular power respectful of specific national conditions and traditions." Perón justified his notion of 'national socialism' by arguing that "nationalism need not be at odds with socialism", given that "both, in the end, far from being antagonistic, can be united with a common goal of liberation of peoples and men". In 1972, this was described as "the national expression of socialism, insofar as it represents, expresses and develops in action the aspirations of the popular masses and the Argentine working class". By left-wing Peronist groups, Peronism was regarded as a form of autochthonous socialism that was to grant "political and economic emancipation" to the workers of Argentina. In July 1971, Perón wrote:

For us Justicialist Government is that which serves the people . . . our revolutionary process articulates individual and collective [needs], it is one form of socialism. Therefore a fair socialism, like the one Justicialism wants, and that is why it is called Justicialism, is that in which a community develops in agreement with [the community's] intrinsic conditions.

Perón described his "national socialism" as "a definitive overcoming of foreign imperialism" and "last frontier for achieving political and economic emancipation in Argentina". He stated that "that word that sounds so strange at times, national socialism, lost its strangeness and acquired significance as a vehicle for eradicating the oppression of capital". On capitalism, he claimed: "The history of Peronism had confirmed that, within the capitalist system, there is no solution for the workers"; Peronist national socialism in his understanding had as its aim "to put society at the service of man and man at the service of society; to rescue moral and ethical values, honesty and humility, as the fundamental axis of this stage; to socialise the means of production, nationalise banking, carry out a profound cultural reform, hand over the administration of the land to those who work it through a profound agrarian revolution, nationalise foreign trade." The nationalism of Peronism was to be based on the liberation of "peoples subjugated by the imperial powers" and to exercise the demand for sovereignty through "people's representatives" managed by Perón; he also described imperialism as a part of a deeper problem which were the "limitations of capitalism in sustaining its structure of domination."

Most historians argue that socialism was at least one of the political inspiration of Perón. Federico Finchelstein classified Perón's populism as "the synthesis of nationalism and non-Marxist Christian socialism". Argentinian historian Cristian Buchrucker saw Perón's ideology a mixture of nationalist, populist and Christian socialist elements, while Humberto Cucchetti stated that Peronism was an accumulation of political concepts such as "nationalist socialism, trade unionist tradition, nationalisation of the middle strata, charismatic leadership, revolutionary prophetism, Third Worldism, justicialist ethics, Christian utopia, popular mobilisation and outlines of democratisation". Buchrucker states that while Perón's movement was in the state of constant struggle between competing ideological movements between it, it never abandoned trade unions and its "revolutionary rhetoric that claimed to assume directly the features of a nationalist liberation movement". Jerzy J. Wiatr believed that Perón adhered to what can be described as "a combination of socialist and corporatist ideas with a strong nationalist accent." Emilio Ocampo claimed that Perón "incorporated revolutionary Marxist elements and rhetoric, always appealing to a strong nationalist sentiment."

Political scientist Rafael di Tella described Peronism as a combination of political Catholicism with socialism. Similarly, historian Raanan Rein classified Peronism as a nationalistic populism that was shaped by Catholic social teaching and socialist currents. Others propose to instead see Peronism as a combination of nationalism with socialism - Peter Ranis wrote that Perón "fused an indigenous socialism with Argentine nationalism through Peronism". Lily Balloffet noted that Perón's policies were very similar to that of Gamal Abdel Nasser, and that both regimes were notable for anti-imperialist nationalism, the 'Third Position' philosophy of non-alignment in the Cold War and "socialist" economic policies. Gary B. Madison states that Perón's policies represented populist socialism.

American historian Garrett John Roberts saw Peronism as an "ultranationalist socialist labor movement", and argued that Perón pursued "socialist and nationalist" policies, noting that the Perón's Five Year Plan followed the pattern of Soviet economic programs under Joseph Stalin. Alberto Spektorowski concluded that Perón accurately described his ideology as 'national socialism'; to Spektorowski, Perón synthesized "national integralism, anti-imperialism and social justice". He also noted that Perón was shaped by left-wing nationalism as well as syndicalism, and formed a revolutionary movement in the sense that in Argentina, "the ideological confrontation was between nationalism represented by Peronism and the old conservative order."

According to Ronaldo Munck, "many observers even saw Perón himself as some kind of nationalist, socialist leader, if not as Argentina's Lenin." On similarities and differences of Perón and the revolutionary wing of Peronism, Munck wrote that Perón's later conflict with the left wing of his movement was not ideological, but was more based on power politics: "The purely anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchic political programme of the Montoneros ("national socialism") was not incompatible with Peron's economic project of "national reconstruction", but their power of mass mobilisation was." Lester A. Sobel also argues that in regards to his eventual conflict with the Peronist left, "Perón was less opposed to socialism than to the rifts within his movement, caused in part by antagonism between Marxists and non-Marxists".

In his political science book Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, Seymour Martin Lipset noted that "Peronism, much like Marxist parties, has been oriented toward the poorer classes, primarily urban workers but also the more impoverished rural population." He characterized Peronism as an "anticapitalist populist nationalism which appeals to the lower strata". Lipset argued that Peronism can be seen as a left-wing equivalent of fascism: "If Peronism is considered a variant of fascism, then it is a fascism of the left because it is based on the social strata who would otherwise turn to socialism or Communism as an outlet for their frustrations." He classified Peronism as a "form of "left" extremism".

Peronism was also described as a form of Third World socialism, or a distinctly Argentinian kind of a populist, non-Marxist socialism akin to African socialism and Arab socialism. German political scientist Lisa Bogerts considers Peronism a "broader historical movement of communism and socialism", representing a movement different from the mainstream socialist movements in Argentina such as the Argentine Socialist Party. Similarly, Donald C. Hodges described Peronism as a "peculiar brand of socialism" that heavily incorporated elements of nationalism and Christian social teaching. Writing on Perón, Charles D. Ameringer argued that "The rise to power of Juan Perón in 1943 was not the end of the socialist impulse in Argentina; it was the culmination" and added that "much of the social legislation either introduced or implemented by Perón . . . originated with the Socialist Party."

As 1954 drew to a close, Perón unveiled reforms far more controversial to the normally conservative Argentine public, the legalization of divorce and of prostitution. The Roman Catholic Church's Argentine leaders, whose support of Perón's government had been steadily waning since the advent of the Eva Perón Foundation, were now open antagonists of the man they called "the tyrant." Though much of Argentina's media had, since 1950, been either controlled or monitored by the administration, lurid pieces on his alleged relationship with an underage girl named Nélida Rivas (known as Nelly), filled the gossip pages. Pressed by reporters on whether his supposed new paramour was, as the magazines claimed, thirteen years of age, the fifty-nine-year-old Perón responded that he was "not superstitious." Later, while on exile, Perón commented on Nelly: "That young lady I met was a girl who attended the UES like many others. She is a child, and as a man I could not or cannot see in her anything other than what she is: a child. Because of my age, because of my experience, you can be sure that I did not transgress moral codes."

It is unknown whether the relationship between Nelly Rivas and Perón really took place. Victoria Allison considers the story a part of smear campaign against Perón conducted by the military junta of Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, which included similar charges and rumours about Perón. Silvana G. Ferreyra notes that despite the story being a popular talking point amongst anti-Peronist circles, the Argentinian public at large did not believe the allegations, writing: "As the years went by, the persistence of the Peronist identity among the popular classes was a clear sign of the ineffectiveness of these denunciations." Perón's biographer, Jill Hedges, argues that "the concept was hardly novel" in Argentina, and rumours of political figures having affairs with young girls in domestic service or similar positions were common, which did not make the story stand out amongst the other anti-Peronist allegations of the smear campaign. Perón was also accused of having sexual encounters with film stars during the 1954 Mar del Plata International Film Festival, and photos of him with the members of the women's branch of Secondary Students' Union (Spanish: Unión de Estudiantes Secundarios, UES) that Rivas belonged to sparked moralistic critique already before the allegation of his romance with her was made. Anti-Peronist media mocked Perón for posing with the women of the UES, claiming that he was trying to "forget the irreparable absence [of Eva Perón]"; shortly afterwards, gossip of Perón's alleged relationship with Rivas appeared for the first time.

Before long, however, the president's humor on the subject ran out and, following the expulsion of two Catholic priests he believed to be behind his recent image problems, a 15 June 1955 declaration of the Sacred Consistorial Congregation (not of Pope Pius XII himself, who alone had authority to excommunicate a head of state) was interpreted as declaring Perón excommunicated. The following day, Perón called for a rally of support on the Plaza de Mayo, a time-honored custom among Argentine presidents during a challenge. However, as he spoke before a crowd of thousands, Navy fighter jets flew overhead and dropped bombs into the crowded square below before seeking refuge in Uruguay.

The incident, part of a coup attempt against Perón, killed 364 people and was, from a historical perspective, the only air assault ever on Argentine soil, as well as a portent of the mayhem that Argentine society would suffer in the 1970s. It moreover touched off a wave of reprisals on the part of Peronists. Reminiscent of the incidents in 1953, Peronist crowds ransacked eleven Buenos Aires churches, including the Metropolitan Cathedral. On 16 September 1955, a nationalist Catholic group from both the Army and Navy, led by General Eduardo Lonardi, General Pedro E. Aramburu, and Admiral Isaac Rojas, led a revolt from Córdoba. They took power in a coup three days later, which they named Revolución Libertadora (the "Liberating Revolution"). Perón barely escaped with his life and fled on the gunboat ARP Paraguay provided by Paraguayan leader Alfredo Stroessner, up the Paraná River. On his way to the port, Perón's car broke down which forced him to ask an astonished bus driver to help tow it through the rain.

At that point Argentina was more politically polarized than it had been since 1880. The landowning elites and other conservatives pointed to an exchange rate that had rocketed from 4 to 30 pesos per dollar and consumer prices that had risen nearly fivefold. Employers and moderates generally agreed, qualifying that with the fact the economy had grown by over 40% (the best showing since the 1920s). The underprivileged and humanitarians looked back upon the era as one in which real wages grew by over a third and better working conditions arrived alongside benefits like pensions, health care, paid vacations and the construction of record numbers of needed schools, hospitals, works of infrastructure and housing.

Perón's stay in Venezuela had been cut short by the 1958 ousting of General Pérez Jiménez. In Panama, he met the nightclub singer María Estela Martínez (known as "Isabel"). Eventually settling in Madrid, Spain under the protection of Francisco Franco, he married Isabel in 1961 and was admitted back into the Catholic Church in 1963.

Following a failed December 1964 attempt to return to Buenos Aires, he sent his wife to Argentina in 1965, to meet political dissidents and advance Perón's policy of confrontation and electoral boycotts. She organized a meeting in the house of Bernardo Alberte, Perón's delegate and sponsor of various left-wing Peronist movements such as the CGT de los Argentinos (CGTA), an offshoot of the umbrella CGT union. During Isabel's visit, adviser Raúl Lastiri introduced her to his father-in-law, José López Rega. A policeman with an interest in the occult, he won Isabel's trust through their common dislike of Jorge Antonio, a prominent Argentine industrialist and the Peronist movement's main financial backer during their perilous 1960s. Accompanying her to Spain, López Rega worked for Perón's security before becoming the couple's personal secretary. A return of the Popular Union (UP) in 1965 and their victories in congressional elections that year helped lead to the overthrow of the moderate President Arturo Illia, and to the return of dictatorship.

Perón became increasingly unable to control the CGT, itself. Though he had the support of its Secretary General, José Alonso, others in the union favored distancing the CGT from the exiled leader. Chief among them was Steel and Metalworkers Union head Augusto Vandor. Vandor challenged Perón from 1965 to 1968 by defying Perón's call for an electoral boycott (leading the UP to victories in the 1965 elections), and with mottos such as "Peronism without Perón" and "to save Perón, one has to be against Perón." Dictator Juan Carlos Onganía's continued repression of labour demands, however, helped lead to Vandor's rapprochement with Perón – a development cut short by Vandor's as-yet unsolved 1969 murder. Labour agitation increased; the CGTA, in particular, organized opposition to the dictatorship between 1968 and 1972, and it would have an important role in the May–June 1969 Cordobazo insurrection.

Perón began courting the far left during Onganía's dictatorship. In his book La Hora de los Pueblos (1968), Perón enunciated the main principles of his purported new Tricontinental political vision:

Mao is at the head of Asia, Nasser of Africa, De Gaulle of the old Europe and Castro of Latin America.

He supported the more militant unions and maintained close links with the Montoneros, a far-left Catholic Peronist group. On 1 June 1970, the Montoneros kidnapped and assassinated former anti-Peronist President Pedro Aramburu in retaliation for the June 1956 mass execution of a Peronist uprising against the junta. In 1971, he sent two letters to the film director Octavio Getino, one congratulating him for his work with Fernando Solanas and Gerardo Vallejo, in the Grupo Cine Liberación, and another concerning two film documentaries, La Revolución Justicialista and Actualización política y doctrinaria.

He also cultivated ties with ultraconservatives and the extreme right. He supported the leader of the conservative wing of the UCR, his erstwhile prisoner Ricardo Balbín, against competition from within the UCR itself. Members of the right-wing Tacuara Nationalist Movement, considered the first Argentine guerrilla group, also turned towards him. Founded in the early 1960s, the Tacuaras were a fascist, anti-Semitic and conformist group founded on the model of Primo de Rivera's Falange, and at first strongly opposed Peronism. However, they split after the 1959 Cuban Revolution into three groups: the one most opposed to the Peronist alliance, led by Catholic priest Julio Meinvielle, retained the original hard-line stance; the New Argentina Movement (MNA), headed by Dardo Cabo, was founded on 9 June 1961, to commemorate General Valle's Peronist uprising on the same date in 1956, and became the precursor to all modern Catholic nationalist groups in Argentina; and the Revolutionary Nationalist Tacuara Movement (MNRT), formed by Joe Baxter and José Luis Nell, who joined Peronism believing in its capacity for revolution, and without forsaking nationalism, broke from the Church and abandoned anti-Semitism. Baxter's MNRT became progressively Marxist, and many of the Montoneros and of the ERP's leaders came from this group.

Following Onganía's replacement in June 1970, General Roberto M. Levingston proposed the replacement of Argentina's myriad political parties with "four or five" (vetted by the Revolución Argentina regime). This attempt to govern indefinitely against the will of the different political parties united Peronists and their opposition in a joint declaration of 11 November 1970, billed as la Hora del Pueblo (The Hour of the People), which called for free and immediate democratic elections to put an end to the political crisis. The declaration was signed by the Radical Civic Union (UCRP), the Justicialist Party (Peronist Party), the Argentine Socialist Party (PSA), the Democratic Progressive Party (PCP) and the Partido Bloquista (PB).

The opposition's call for elections led to Levingston's replacement by General Alejandro Lanusse, in March 1971. Faced with strong opposition and social conflicts, General Lanusse declared his intention to restore constitutional democracy by 1973, though without Peronist participation. Lanusse proposed the Gran Acuerdo Nacional (Great National Agreement) in July 1971, which was to find an honorable exit for the military junta without allowing Peronism to participate in the election. The proposal was rejected by Perón, who formed the FRECILINA alliance (Frente Cívico de Liberación Nacional, Civic Front of National Liberation), headed by his new delegate Héctor José Cámpora (a member of the Peronist Left). The alliance gathered his Justicialist Party and the Integration and Development Movement (MID), headed by Arturo Frondizi. FRECILINA pressed for free and unrestricted elections, which ultimately took place in March 1973.

The improving economic situation encouraged Perón to pursue interventionist social and economic policies similar to those he had carried out in the Forties: nationalizing banks and various industries, subsidizing native businesses and consumers, regulating and taxing the agricultural sector, reviving the IAPI, placing restrictions on foreign investment, and funding a number of social welfare programs. In addition, new rights for workers were introduced.

James P. Brennan and Marcelo Rougier note that during Perón's third presidency, "virtually no aspect of the national economy was left out — industry, technology and science, tax policy — all were included, and the reforms were significant". Perón passed laws that suspended all eviction proceedings, facilitated credit to evicted workers and farmers, encouraged establishment of worker cooperatives, prohibited foreign investment unless technological improvement acoompanied it, nationalized foreign markets in Argentina, established state supervision of the marketing of food products and raw resources, and taxed unproductive and underused land. Perón also nationalized the banking system, which had been the core demand of Gelbard.

The 1973 oil shock, however, forced Ber Gelbard to rethink the Central Bank's projected reserves and, accordingly, undid planned reductions in stubborn budget deficits, then around US$2 billion a year (4% of GDP). Increasingly frequent collective bargaining agreements in excess of Social Pact wage guidelines and a resurgence in inflation led to growing strain on the viability of the plan by mid-1974, however.

Nevertheless, Perón's Social Pact resulted in a general wage increase of 20%, followed by wage and price freeze that was to remain until June 1975. Conversely, Argentine private business recorded a 16% drop in profits on average. By the end of 1973, Argentina had a record surplus in foreign trade, which enhanced the redistributive policies of Perón. Inflation fell abruptly despite wage increases. However, the rise of fuel prices resulted in a renegotiation of the Social Pact in February 1974. Perón intervened in favor of trade unions - the new Social Pact for 1974 had Perón announce an increase of 13% in nominal wages, restoring purchasing power that workers lost in 1973, and increasing the workers' share of national income. This satistifed the Peronist trade unions - workers' incomes recovered by 5% on average, while Argentine corporations faced another drop in profits.

The Peronist economic plan also carried out ambitious reforms for regional development, with the goal of decentralizing industrial activities by promting underdeveloped and frontier areas and curtailing the already developed ones. Perón banned the establishment of new enterprises in the federal capital of Argentina, Buenos Aires. At the same time, underdeveloped areas were designated as "promotion zones". The poor northwest provinces of San Luis, La Rioja and Catamarca were given additional developmental measures.

Brennan and Rougier remarked that compared to his first and second term, in the 1970s Perón adopted a "more populist agenda, one that this time had a faintly Marxist tinge to it." The government's stated objective of the Social Pact was to reduce the role of business in national income. While labelled "class collaboration", Perón's economic policy strongly favoured trade unions and greatly disadvantaged business. Reporting on the power that Perón's Social Pact gave to trade unions, an association of metalworking industry businesses in Córdoba, the Cámara de Industriales Metalúrgicos de Córdoba, wrote: "Unions' tactics have changed. There are no general strikes but rather demands for higher wages, disregarding all legal procedures, are made factory by factory. The methods adopted are personal intimidation and reducing the already low levels of productivity."

However, Perón's third term was also marked by an escalating conflict between the Peronist left- and right-wing factions. This turmoil was fueled primarily by calls for repression against the left on the part of leading CGT figures, a growing segment of the armed forces (particularly the navy) and right-wing radicals within his own party, notably Perón's most fascist adviser, José López Rega. López Rega, appointed Minister of Social Welfare, was in practice given power far beyond his purview, soon controlling up to 30 percent of the federal budget. Diverting increasing funds, he formed the Triple A, a death squad that soon began targeting not only the violent left; but moderate opposition, as well. The Montoneros became marginalized in the Peronist movement as they took an increasingly hostile attitude towards the Peronist bureaucratic trade unions, which formed the dominating faction. Explaining the conflict, historians Ronaldo Munck or Ricardo Falcón noted:

The radical Montoneros organisation provided little political leadership against the new rise of the trade union bureaucracy. In fact, left-wing Peronism had always maintained a somewhat moralistic view of the labour bureaucracy. Emphasis was placed on the leaders' individual corruption and their treacherous role, to the detriment of an understanding of their structural and political role in the labour movement. According to the

militaristic logic of the Montoneros the answer to these traitors was 'execution'. Vandor had been killed in 1969, his rival José Alonso in 1970, now in 1973 it was the turn of CGT leader José Rucci, and a year later building workers' union leader Rogelio Coria.

The rift between Perón and the far left became irreconcilable following 25 September 1973, murder of José Ignacio Rucci, the moderately conservative Secretary General of CGT. Rucci was killed in a commando ambush in front of his residence. His murder was long attributed to the Montoneros (whose record of violence was well-established by then), but it is arguably Argentina's most prominent unsolved mystery. Perón was heartbroken by the assassination of trade union leader José Ignacio Rucci, for which the Montoneros claimed responsibility. Rucci's assassination marked the first time Perón cried in public. Perón went into state of depression, and declared at his death: "They killed my son. They cut off my legs". The death of Rucci made Perón cold towards Montoneros, culminating in Perón demanding their expulsion from the Justicalist Movement on May Day 1974, which insulted the Peronist Left. However, Perón did not desire to abandon the Montoneros, and he sought to restore his trust in his last speech from June 1974, where he denounced "the oligarchy and the pressures exerted by imperialism upon his government", suggesting that he was being manipulated by the Peronist right wing.

Another guerrilla group, the Guevarist ERP, also opposed the Peronist right-wing. They started engaging in armed struggle, assaulting an important Army barracks in Azul, Buenos Aires Province on 19 January, and creating a foco (insurrection) in Tucumán, a historically underdeveloped province in Argentina's largely rural northwest. In May 1973 the ERP claimed to have extorted $1 million in goods from the Ford Motor Company, after murdering one executive and wounding another. Five months after the payment, the guerrillas killed another Ford executive and his three bodyguards. Only after Ford threatened to close down their operation in Argentina altogether, did Perón agree to have his army protect the plant.

Perón's failing health complicated matters. He developed an enlarged prostate and heart disease, and by at least one account, he may have been senile by the time he was sworn in for his third term. His wife frequently had to take over as Acting President over the course of the next year.

Perón maintained a full schedule of policy meetings with both government officials and chief base of support, the CGT. He also presided over the inaugural of the Atucha I Nuclear Power Plant (Latin America's first) in April; the reactor, begun while he was in exile, was the fruition of work started in the 1950s by the National Atomic Energy Commission, his landmark bureau. His diminishing support from the far left (which believed Perón had come under the control of the right-wing entorno (entourage) led by López Rega, UOM head Lorenzo Miguel, and Perón's own wife) turned to open enmity following rallies on the Plaza de Mayo on 1 May and 12 June in which the president condemned their demands and increasingly violent activities.

Perón was reunited with another friend from the 1950s – Paraguayan dictator Alfredo Stroessner – on 16 June to sign the bilateral treaty that broke ground on Yacyretá Hydroelectric Dam (the world's second-largest). Perón returned to Buenos Aires with clear signs of pneumonia and, on 28 June, he had a series of heart attacks. Isabel was on a trade mission to Europe, but returned urgently and was secretly sworn in on an interim basis on 29 June. Following a promising day at the official presidential residence of Quinta de Olivos in the Buenos Aires suburb of Olivos, Juan Perón had a final attack on Monday, 1 July 1974 and died at 13:15. He was 78 years old.

Perón's corpse was first transported by hearse to Buenos Aires Metropolitan Cathedral for a funeral mass the next day. Afterwards the body, dressed in full military uniform, was taken to the Palace of the National Congress, where it lay in state over the next 46 hours, during which more than 130,000 people filed past the coffin. Finally, at 09:30 on a rainy Thursday, 4 July the funeral procession commenced. Perón's Argentine flag-covered casket was placed on a limber towed by a small army truck (escorted by cavalry and a large motorcade of motorcycles and a few armored vehicles) through the capital's streets back to Olivos. At least one million people turned out for Perón's funeral, some of whom threw flowers at the casket and chanted, "¡Perón! ¡Perón! ¡Perón!" as it passed by. Along the 16-kilometer (10-mile) route from the Palace to Olivos, hundreds of armed soldiers lining it were assigned to restrain the crowd. As many as 2,000 foreign journalists covered the ceremony. The funeral cortege reached its final destination two and a half hours later. There, the coffin was greeted by a 21-gun salute. Many international heads of state offered condolences to Argentina following the demise of President Perón. Three days of official mourning were declared thereafter. Perón had recommended that his wife, Isabel, rely on Balbín for support, and at the president's burial Balbín uttered an historic phrase: "The old adversary bids farewell to a friend." Paraguay declared eight days of mourning, Uruguay declared seven days of mourning, Brazil, Bolivia, Cuba and Spain declared three days of mourning.

Isabel Perón succeeded her husband to the presidency, but proved incapable of managing the country's political and economic problems, including the left-wing insurgency and the reactions of the extreme right. Ignoring her late husband's advice, Isabel gave Balbín no role in her new government, instead granting broad powers to López Rega, who started a "dirty war" against political opponents.

Isabel Perón's term ended abruptly on 24 March 1976 after a military coup d'état. A military junta, headed by General Jorge Videla, took control of the country, establishing the self-styled National Reorganization Process. The junta ramped up the "dirty war", combining widespread persecution of political dissidents with state terrorism. The death toll rose to thousands (at least 9,000, with human rights organizations claiming it was closer to 30,000). Many of these were "the disappeared" (desaparecidos), people kidnapped and executed without trial or record.