Berlin Airlift

Background (1945 – mid-1948)

Potsdam Agreement and division of Berlin

From 17 July to 2 August 1945, the victorious Allies signed the Potsdam Agreement on the fate of postwar Europe, calling for the division of defeated Germany, west of the Oder–Neisse line, into four temporary occupation zones, each controlled by one of the four occupying Allied powers: the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union (thus re-affirming principles already given by the Yalta Conference). These zones were roughly aligned with the locations of the allied armies. All four zones would be treated as a single economic unit through the Allied Control Council (consisting of the military governors of each zone) located in Berlin. Berlin was also divided into four occupation zones, despite the city's location, 100 miles (160 km) inside Soviet-controlled eastern Germany. The United States, United Kingdom, and France controlled western portions of the city, while Soviet troops controlled the eastern sector.

Each military governor had ultimate authority in his zone which meant the Allied Control Council required unanimous agreement. The Allied Western powers never explicitly agreed with the Soviet Union that they had right of access to Berlin. There was only a verbal agreement between Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov, the Soviet commander in Germany, General Lucius D. Clay, Commander in Chief, United States Forces in Europe, and Sir Robert Weeks, representative of the British government. On 30 November 1945, the Allied Control Council in Berlin approved the only written agreement regarding transportation to Berlin from the West. This allowed three 20-mile-wide air corridors between the city and West Germany for French, British and American planes. Also stipulated in the agreement was for Berlin airspace to be controlled by a four-power Air Safety Centre.

In the eastern zone, the Soviet authorities forcibly unified the Communist Party of Germany and Social Democratic Party (SPD) in the Socialist Unity Party ("SED"), claiming that it would not have a Marxist–Leninist or Soviet orientation. The SED leaders then called for the "establishment of an anti-fascist, democratic regime, a parliamentary democratic republic" while the Soviet Military Administration suppressed all other political activities. Factories, equipment, technicians, managers and skilled personnel were removed to the Soviet Union.

In a June 1945 meeting, Stalin informed German communist leaders that he expected to slowly undermine the British position within their occupation zone, that the United States would withdraw within a year or two and that nothing would then stand in the way of a united Germany under communist control within the Soviet orbit. Stalin and other leaders told visiting Bulgarian and Yugoslavian delegations in early 1946 that Germany must be both Soviet and communist.

Immediate causes (early 1948)

London Six-Power Conference (1948)

Trilateral talks were held in London, between the UK, US, France and the Benelux nations, met twice in London (London 6-Power Conference) in the first half of 1948 to discuss the future of Germany, going ahead despite Soviet threats to ignore any resulting decisions. This resulted in the London Programme, aimed at creating economic revival and political re-structuring of the Western German zones. In response to the announcement of the first of these meetings, in late January 1948, the Soviets began stopping British and American trains to Berlin to check passenger identities. As outlined in an announcement on 7 March 1948, all of the governments present approved the extension of the Marshall Plan to Germany, finalised the economic merger of the western occupation zones in Germany and agreed upon the establishment of a federal system of government for them.

After a 9 March meeting between Stalin and his military advisers, a secret memorandum was sent to Molotov on 12 March 1948, outlining a plan to force the policy of the Western Allies into line with the wishes of the Soviet government by "regulating" access to Berlin. The Allied Control Council (ACC) met for the last time on 20 March 1948, when Vasily Sokolovsky demanded to know the outcome of the London Conference and, on being told by negotiators that they had not yet heard the final results from their governments, he said, "I see no sense in continuing this meeting, and I declare it adjourned."

The entire Soviet delegation rose and walked out. Truman later noted,

for most of Germany, this act merely formalised what had been an obvious fact for some time, namely, that the four-power control machinery had become unworkable. For the city of Berlin, however, this was an indication for a major crisis.

On 25 March 1948, the Soviets issued orders restricting Western military and passenger traffic between the American, British and French occupation zones and Berlin. These new measures began on 1 April along with an announcement that no cargo could leave Berlin by rail without the permission of the Soviet commander. Each train and truck was to be searched by the Soviet authorities. On 2 April, General Clay ordered a halt to all military trains and required that supplies to the military garrison be transported by air, in what was dubbed the "Little Lift."

Deutsche Mark

Creation of an economically stable western Germany required reform of the unstable Reichsmark German currency introduced after the 1920s German inflation. The Soviets continued the debasing of the Reichsmark, which had undergone severe inflation during the war, by excessive printing, resulting in many Germans using cigarettes as a de facto currency or for bartering. The Soviets opposed western plans for a reform. They interpreted the new currency as an unjustified, unilateral decision, and responded by cutting all land links between West Berlin and West Germany. The Soviets believed that the only currency that should be allowed to circulate was the currency that they issued themselves.

Anticipating the introduction of a new currency by the other countries in the non-Soviet zones, the Soviet Union in May 1948 directed its military to introduce its own new currency and to permit only the Soviet currency to be used in their sector of Berlin if the other countries brought in a different currency there. On 18 June the United States, Britain and France announced that on 21 June the Deutsche Mark (DM) would be introduced, but the Soviets refused to permit its use as legal tender in Berlin. The Allies had already transported 250,000,000 DM into the city and it quickly became the standard currency in all four sectors.

The day after the 18 June 1948 announcement of the new Deutsche Mark, Soviet guards halted all passenger trains and traffic on the autobahn to Berlin, delayed Western and German freight shipments and required that all water transport secure special Soviet permission. On 21 June, the day the Deutsche Mark was introduced, the Soviet military halted a United States military supply train to Berlin and sent it back to western Germany. On 22 June, the Soviets announced that they would introduce the East German mark (Ostmark) in their zone.

The Berlin Blockade (June 1948 – May 1949)

Beginning of the blockade

Stalin wanted to stop Western currency getting into Berlin and some have argued that Stalin used the Berlin Blockade to prevent the creation of a Western German government.

On 24 June 1948, Stalin ordered Soviet troops to block all rail and barge traffic in and out of Berlin. The Soviets stated that the reason for withdrawing the West's access to Berlin was "technical difficulties" on the railways and roads. Electricity was restricted to only 2 hours a day in the western areas of Berlin, something the Soviets explained as being the result of "severe shortages of electric current". As there were only agreements for air corridors, those remained open. However, foot traffic between zones, including public transportation by U-Bahn and S-Bahn continued, meaning that movement between East and West continued throughout the Airlift operation, especially to obtain food in the Eastern Zone. Believing that Britain, France, and the United States had little option other than to acquiesce, the Soviet Military Administration in Germany celebrated the beginning of the blockade. General Clay felt that the Soviets were bluffing about Berlin since they would not want to be viewed as starting a Third World War. He believed that Stalin did not want a war and that Soviet actions were aimed at exerting military and political pressure on the West to obtain concessions, relying on the West's prudence and unwillingness to provoke a war. General Curtis LeMay, commander of United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), reportedly favored an aggressive response to the blockade, in which his B-29s with fighter escort would approach Soviet air bases while ground troops attempted to reach Berlin; Washington vetoed the plan. However, the West answered by introducing a counter-blockade. Over the following months, this counter-blockade would have a damaging impact on East Germany, as the drying up of coal and steel shipments seriously hindered industrial development in the Soviet zone.

Western response: The Berlin Airlift

Early on in the blockade, General Clay and other strategists including British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, were aware that a larger airlift may be required to support supplies to Berlin.

Phase 1 (26 June – September 1948)

On 25 June 1948, Clay gave the order to launch Operation Vittles. The next day, 32 C-47s lifted off for Berlin hauling 80 tons of cargo, including milk, flour and medicine. On 28 June 1948 LeMay appointed Brigadier General Joseph Smith, commander of the installation at Wiesbaden, as the Berlin Airlift Task Force Commander. The airlift was named Operation Vittles by the U.S. and Operation Plainfare by the British. The first British aircraft flew on 28 June. At that time, the airlift was expected to last three weeks.

On 27 June, Clay cabled William Draper with an estimate of the current situation:

I have already arranged for our maximum airlift to start on Monday [June 28]. For a sustained effort, we can use seventy Dakotas [C-47s]. The number which the British can make available is not yet known, although General Robertson is somewhat doubtful of their ability to make this number available. Our two Berlin airports can handle in the neighborhood of fifty additional airplanes per day. These would have to be C-47s, C-54s or planes with similar landing characteristics, as our airports cannot take larger planes. LeMay is urging two C-54 groups. With this airlift, we should be able to bring in 600 or 700 tons a day. While 2,000 tons a day is required in normal foods, 600 tons a day (using dried foods to the maximum extent) will substantially increase the morale of the German people and will unquestionably seriously disturb the Soviet blockade. To accomplish this, it is urgent that we be given approximately 50 additional transport planes to arrive in Germany at the earliest practicable date, and each day's delay will of course decrease our ability to sustain our position in Berlin. Crews would be needed to permit maximum operation of these planes.

Accommodating the large number of flights to Berlin of dissimilar aircraft with widely varying flight characteristics required close co-ordination. Smith and his staff developed a complex timetable for flights called the "block system": three eight-hour shifts of a C-54 section to Berlin followed by a C-47 section. Aircraft were scheduled to take off every four minutes, flying 1,000 feet (300 m) higher than the flight in front. This pattern began at 5,000 feet (1,500 m) and was repeated five times. This system of stacked inbound serials was later dubbed "the ladder".

During the first week, the airlift averaged only ninety tons a day, but by the second week it reached 1,000 tons. This likely would have sufficed had the effort lasted only a few weeks, as originally believed. The Communist press in East Berlin ridiculed the project. It derisively referred to "the futile attempts of the Americans to save face and to maintain their untenable position in Berlin."

Phase 2 (October 1948 – March 1949)

On 20 October, the Office of Military Government increased the daily supply requirement for Berlin from 4,500 to 5,620 tons: 1,435 tons for food, 3,084 tons for coal, 255 tons for commerce and industry supplies, 35 tons for newsprint, 16 tons for liquid fuel, 2 tons for medical supplies, 763 for the US, British and French Military, and 30 tons for C54 passenger flights (US and French).

Although the early estimates were that about 4,000 to 5,000 tons per day would be needed to supply the city, this was made in the context of summer weather, when the airlift was only expected to last a few weeks. As the operation dragged on into autumn, the situation changed considerably. The food requirements would remain the same (around 1,500 tons), but the need for additional coal to heat the city dramatically increased the total amount of cargo to be transported by an additional 6,000 tons a day.

To maintain the airlift under these conditions, the current system would have to be greatly expanded. Aircraft were available, and the British started adding their larger Handley Page Hastings in November, but maintaining the fleet proved to be a serious problem. Tunner looked to the Germans once again, hiring former Luftwaffe mechanics.

Another problem was the lack of runways in Berlin to land on: two at Tempelhof and one at Gatow—neither of which was designed to support the loads the C-54s were putting on them. All of the existing runways required hundreds of labourers, who ran onto them between landings and dumped sand into the runway's Marston Mat (pierced steel planking) to soften the surface and help the planking survive. Since this system could not endure through the winter, between July and September 1948 a 1,800-metre (5,900 ft)-long asphalt runway was constructed at Tempelhof.

Far from ideal, with the approach being over Berlin's apartment blocks, the runway nevertheless was a major upgrade to the airport's capabilities. With it in place, the auxiliary runway was upgraded from Marston Matting to asphalt between September and October 1948. A similar upgrade program was carried out by the British at Gatow during the same period, also adding a second runway, using concrete.

The French Air Force, meanwhile, had become involved in the First Indochina War, so it could only bring up a few French built Junkers Ju 52s (known as A.A.C. 1 Toucan) to support its own troops, and they were too small and slow to be of much help. However, France agreed to build a complete, new and larger airport in its sector on the shores of Lake Tegel. French military engineers, managing German construction crews, were able to complete the construction in under 90 days. Because of a shortage of heavy equipment, the first runway was mostly built by hand, by thousands of labourers who worked day and night.

Peak and Easter Offensive (April 1949)

The U.S. Air Force reported delivering 2,325,609.6 tons of supplies to Berlin. 76 percent of this total were supplied by the U.S. Air Force, 17 percent by the Royal Air Force, and 7 percent by British civilian planes.

In January 1949, Major General Laurence S. Kuter, commander of the Military Air Transport Service, praised the pilots' actions in a speech at the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences saying "For the first time in peacetime history, strategic air transport has become a conspicuous expression of American air power, peace power, and an effective weapon of diplomacy."

By April 1949, airlift operations were running smoothly and Tunner wanted to shake up his command to discourage complacency. He believed in the spirit of competition between units and, coupled with the idea of a big event, felt that this would encourage them to greater efforts. He decided that, on Easter Sunday, the airlift would break all records. To do this, maximum efficiency was needed and so, to simplify cargo-handling, only coal would be airlifted. Coal stockpiles were built up for the effort and maintenance schedules were altered so that the maximum number of aircraft were available.

From noon on 15 April to noon on 16 April 1949, crews worked around the clock. When it was over, 12,941 tons of coal had been delivered in 1,383 flights, without a single accident. A welcome side effect of the effort was that operations in general were boosted, and tonnage increased from 6,729 tons to 8,893 tons per day thereafter. In total, the airlift delivered 234,476 tons in April.

On 25 April, the Soviet news agency TASS announced that the USSR was open to ending the blockade, which came to an end at midnight on 12 May.

Civilian experience and humanitarian efforts

When the blockade began, some German people in the Soviet zones could get food in packages through the post, if they had connections to people in West Germany. During the blockade, Western sectors from East Berlin or the countryside were never sealed off, and as a result, nearly half a million tons of goods came into the Western sectors from Soviet zone sources. Approximately a third of the Western sectors' food came from the east, and public transport continued to run between East and West. There was, thus, a black market operation, and a number of West Berliners went to the countryside to forage, bartering or using the Westmark to secure goods. By November 1948, so-called Free Shops began in East Berlin and Brandenburg allowing West Berliners to purchase provisions using the Eastmark. Some West Berlin companies cooperated with individual Soviet zone companies and the Deutsche Wirtschaftskommission (DWK) to produce goods for Soviet and East German people at a cost of raw materials and money.

Soft Power: the Elizabethan Festival

In late August and early September 1948, a soft-power offensive also began, with the Red Army Choir (the Alexandrov Ensemble) performing for mass audiences in public squares of the Soviet Zone. The British countered with an Elizabethan Festival featuring small, high-culture productions, with University of Cambridge students performing works by William Shakespeare and Henry Purcell.Der Spiegel described the contrast: "The change from the Russians to the British was like a lesson in international psychology."

An important operation for maintaining the morale of Berliners was "Operation Little Vittles". Lieutenant Gail Halvorsen, one of the many airlift pilots, decided to use his off-time to fly into Berlin and make movies with his hand-held camera. He arrived at Tempelhof on 17 July 1948 on one of the C-54s and walked over to a crowd of children who had gathered at the end of the runway to watch the aircraft. As a goodwill gesture, he handed out his only two sticks of Wrigley's Doublemint Gum. The children quickly divided up the pieces as best they could, even passing around the wrapper for others to smell. He was so impressed, by their gratitude and that they did not fight over them, that he promised the next time he returned he would drop off more. Before he left them, a child asked him how they would know it was him flying over. He replied, "I'll wiggle my wings."

End of the Blockade (May–September 1949)

On 25 April 1949, the Soviet news agency TASS reported a willingness by the Soviets to lift the blockade. The next day, the US State Department stated that the "way appears clear" for the blockade to end. Soon afterwards, the four powers began serious negotiations, and a settlement was reached on Western terms. On 4 May 1949, the Allies announced an agreement to end the blockade in eight days.

The Soviet blockade of Berlin was lifted at one minute after midnight on 12 May 1949. A British convoy immediately drove through to West Berlin, and the first train from West Germany reached West Berlin at 5:32 am. Later that day, an enormous crowd celebrated the end of the blockade. General Clay, whose retirement had been announced by US President Truman on 3 May 1949, was saluted by 11,000 US soldiers and dozens of aircraft. Once home, Clay received a ticker tape parade in New York City, was invited to address the US Congress, and was honoured with a medal from President Truman.

Nevertheless, supply flights to Berlin continued for some time to build up a comfortable surplus, though night flying and then weekend flights could be eliminated once the surplus was deemed to be large enough. By 24 July 1949, three months' worth of supplies had been amassed.

On 18 August 1949, Flt Lt Roy Mather DFC AFC and his crew of Flt Lt Roy Lewis Stewart Hathaway AFC, Flt Lt Richardson and Royston William Marshall AFM of 206 squadron, flew back to Wunstorf for the 404th time during the blockade, the record number of flights for any pilot of any nationality, either civilian or military.

The Berlin Airlift officially ended on 30 September 1949, after fifteen months.

Soviet response and international diplomacy

Soviet propaganda and negotiations

As of June 1948, the Soviets launched a campaign against Yugoslavia and Josip Broz Tito saying they are "agents of the Anglo-Americans". The Soviets said that they would lift the blockade when West Germany agreed to put aside their plans to introduce the Western D-Mark in Berlin. Stalin believed that the West would capitulate when they realised how difficult it would be to supply Berlin with adequate resources to make it through the winter. He was confident that the West could not afford to go to war over the issue, but the West were just as convinced that Stalin would not go to war. The Soviets also believed that West Berliners, suffering under the increasing shortages, would pressure the Western Allies in conceding; to intensify this, the Soviets excluded West Berliners from the Berlin Magistrat and took command of the city's police force. Soviet communist propaganda was prevalent, throughout the time of the blockade, on the radio, in the press, pamphlets and in posters. However, the municipal elections in December 1948, showed that almost 85 percent of West Berliners voted against communist parties. In the summer and autumn of 1948, Soviet propaganda began to rally against "cosmopolitans", categorising them as an American "fifth column"; the press highlighted stories uncovering cosmopolitans within Soviet culture.

Shift in public opinion

Public opinion shifted during the blockade and there was a sharp decline in interest in communism. For example, an opinion poll in August 1948 showed that 80 percent of those polled listened most to RIAS (a US sponsored radio station in Berlin), whereas only 15 percent listened more to Radio Berlin (a Soviet-run station). The Blockade shifted public postwar apathy, and it gave people a sense of political purpose. On 9 September 1949, a rally of nearly 300,000 Berliners gathered at the Brandenburg Gate to protest against the violence of the East German authorities. Ernst Reuter highlighted this rally saying this showed the strength of Berliners to protect their liberty. The blockade ultimately failed because of the airlift operation, but also because of the resolve of West Berliners. They subsisted on rations, cold homes, only four hours of electricity a day, whilst also being promised food, fuel and employment if they resisted and followed Soviet instructions. Western news outlets also published articles to communicate the issues facing Berlin during the crisis. Two stories from Time and Life wrote about the blockade calling it "The Siege", and a March of Time article discussed the wider concerns about Germany and its future. General Clay was featured on the cover of Time on 8 July 1948.

Aftermath

The Soviets had an advantage in conventional military forces, but were preoccupied with rebuilding their war-torn economy and society. The Western Allies were in a stronger economic position, and the United States in particular not only held technological advantages in aircraft but possessed a small stockpile of atomic bombs. Neither side wanted a war; the Soviets did not disrupt the airlift.

Aftermath for Berlin

As the tempo of the airlift grew, it became apparent that the Western powers might be able to pull off the impossible: indefinitely supplying an entire city by air alone. In response, starting on 1 August 1948, the Soviets offered free food to anyone who crossed into East Berlin and registered their ration cards there, and almost 22,000 Berliners received their cards until 4 August 1948. The great majority of West Berliners, however, rejected Soviet offers of food and supplies.

Throughout the airlift, Soviet and German communists subjected the hard-pressed West Berliners to sustained psychological warfare. In radio broadcasts, they relentlessly proclaimed that all Berlin came under Soviet authority and predicted the imminent abandonment of the city by the Western occupying powers. The Soviets also harassed members of the democratically elected citywide administration, which had to conduct its business in the city hall located in the Soviet sector.

According to the "Berlin Airlift Corridor Incidents Report", which spanned the period between 10 August 1948 and 5 August 1949, there were 733 incidents reported between Soviet and Allied airlift aircraft. During the early months of the airlift, the Soviets used various methods to harass allied aircraft. These included buzzing by Soviet planes, obstructive parachute jumps within the corridors, and shining searchlights to dazzle pilots at night. None of these measures were effective. Former RAF Dakota pilot Dick Arscott described one "buzzing" incident. "Yaks (Soviet fighter aircraft) used to come and buzz you and go over the top of you at about twenty feet which can be off-putting. One day I was buzzed about three times. The following day it started again and he came across twice and I got a bit fed up with it. So when he came for the third time, I turned the aircraft into him and it was a case of chicken, luckily he was the one who chickened out." General Tunner said "They were seen by pilots and were sometimes close, but they were never more than a moral threat."

Attempted Communist putsch in the municipal government

In the autumn of 1948 it became impossible for the non-Communist majority in Greater Berlin's citywide parliament to attend sessions at city hall within the Soviet sector. The parliament (Stadtverordnetenversammlung von Groß-Berlin) had been elected under the provisional constitution of Berlin two years earlier (20 October 1946). As SED-controlled policemen looked on passively, Communist-led mobs repeatedly invaded the Neues Stadthaus, the provisional city hall (located on Parochialstraße since all other central municipal buildings had been destroyed in the War), interrupted the parliament's sessions, and menaced its non-Communist members. The Kremlin organised an attempted putsch for control of all of Berlin through a 6 September takeover of the city hall by SED members.

Three days later RIAS Radio urged Berliners to protest against the actions of the communists. On 9 September 1948 a crowd of 500,000 people gathered at the Brandenburg Gate, next to the ruined Reichstag in the British sector. The airlift was working so far, but many West Berliners feared that the Allies would eventually discontinue it. Then-SPD city councillor Ernst Reuter took the microphone and pleaded for his city, "You peoples of the world, you people of America, of England, of France, look on this city, and recognise that this city, this people, must not be abandoned—cannot be abandoned!"

The crowd surged towards the Soviet-occupied sector and someone climbed up and ripped down the Soviet flag flying from atop the Brandenburg Gate. Soviet military police (MPs) quickly responded, resulting in the killing of one in the unruly crowd. The tense situation could have escalated further and ended up in more bloodshed, but a British deputy provost then intervened and pointedly pushed the Soviet MPs back with his swagger stick. Never before this incident had so many Berliners gathered in unity. The resonance worldwide was enormous, notably in the United States, where a strong feeling of solidarity with Berliners reinforced a general widespread determination not to abandon them.

Berlin's parliament decided to meet instead in the canteen of the Technische Hochschule in Berlin (now Technische Universität Berlin) in the British sector, boycotted by the members of SED, which had gained 19.8% of the electoral votes in 1946. On 30 November 1948 the SED gathered its elected parliament members and 1,100 further activists and held an unconstitutional so-called "extraordinary city assembly" (außerordentliche Stadtverordnetenversammlung) in East Berlin's Metropol-Theater which declared the elected city government (Magistrat) and its democratically elected city councillors to be deposed and replaced it with a new one led by Oberbürgermeister Friedrich Ebert Jr. and consisting only of Communists. This arbitrary act had no legal effect in West Berlin, but the Soviet occupants prevented the elected city government for all of Berlin from further acting in the eastern sector.

December elections

The city parliament, boycotted by its SED members, then voted for its re-election on 5 December 1948, however, inhibited in the eastern sector and denounced by the SED as a Spalterwahl ("divisive election"). The SED did not nominate any candidates for this election and appealed to the electorate in the western sectors to boycott the election, while the democratic parties ran for seats. The turnout amounted to 86.3% of the western electorate with the SPD gaining 64.5% of the votes (= 76 seats), the CDU 19.4% (= 26 seats), and the Liberal-Demokratische Partei (LDP, merged in the FDP in 1949) 16.1% (= 17 seats).

On 7 December the new, de facto West-Berlin-only city parliament elected a new city government in West Berlin headed by Lord Mayor Ernst Reuter, who had already once been elected lord mayor in early 1946 but prevented from taking office by a Soviet veto. Thus two separate city governments officiated in the city divided into East and West versions of its former self. In the east, a communist system supervised by house, street, and block wardens was quickly implemented.

West Berlin's parliament accounted for the de facto political partition of Berlin and replaced the provisional constitution with the new Constitution of Berlin, meant for all Berlin, with effect of 1 October 1950 and de facto restricted to the western sectors only, also renaming city parliament from Stadtverordnetenversammlung von Groß-Berlin (City Council of Greater Berlin) to Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin (House of Representatives of Berlin), city government (from Magistrat von Groß-Berlin (City Council of Greater Berlin) to Senate of Berlin, and head of government (from Oberbürgermeister (Mayor) to Governing Mayor of Berlin.

Consequences

Casualties, costs and logistics

In total, the USAF delivered 1,783,573 tons and the RAF 541,937 tons, totalling 2,326,406 tons, nearly two-thirds of which was coal, on 278,228 flights to Berlin. The C-47s and C-54s together flew over 92 million miles (148 million kilometres) in the process, almost the distance from Earth to the Sun. At the height of the airlift, one plane reached West Berlin every thirty seconds.

Pilots came from the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa. The Royal Australian Air Force delivered 7,968 tons of freight and 6,964 passengers during 2,062 sorties. Three New Zealand crews were attached to No. 46 Group RAF; two sets of aircrew (rotations) were dispatched.

A total of 101 fatalities were recorded during the operation, including 40 Britons and 31 Americans, mostly due to non-flying accidents. One Royal Australian Air Force member was killed in an aircraft crash at Lübeck while attached to No. 27 Squadron RAF. Seventeen American and eight British aircraft crashed during the operation.

The cost of the airlift was shared between the US, UK, and German authorities in the Western sectors of occupation. Estimated costs range from approximately US$224 million to over US$500 million (equivalent to approximately $2.33 billion to $5.21 billion in 2025).

Operational control of the three Allied air corridors was assigned to BARTCC (Berlin Air Route Traffic Control Center) air traffic control located at Tempelhof. Diplomatic approval was granted by a four-power organisation called the Berlin Air Safety Centre, also located in the American sector.

The experience led Washington to consider Stalin's next moves, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff calculated that, if not imminently, the Soviet Union could invoke military action. As a result, Washington began preemptively planning a war that could come by 1957, and anticipated the use of atomic weapons.

Senate reserve

Following the end of the blockade, the Western Allied Powers required the Senate of Berlin to stockpile six months worth of food and basic necessities as preparation against a potential second Berlin blockade. The reserves were liquidated following reunification.

Berlin crises 1946–1962

Millions of East Germans escaped to West Germany from East Germany, and Berlin became a major escape route. This led to major-power conflict over Berlin that stretched at least from 1946 to the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. Dwight D. Eisenhower became US president in 1953 and Nikita Khrushchev became Soviet leader in the same year. Khrushchev tried to push Eisenhower on Berlin in 1958–59. The Soviets backed down when Eisenhower's resolve seemed to match that of Truman. When Eisenhower was replaced by Kennedy in 1961, Khrushchev tried again, with essentially the same result.

Other developments

In the late 1950s, the runways at West Berlin's city centre Tempelhof Airport had become too short to accommodate the new-generation jet aircraft, and Tegel was developed into West Berlin's principal airport. During the 1970s and 1980s Schönefeld Airport had its own crossing points through the Berlin Wall and communist fortifications for western citizens.

The Soviets' contravention by the blockade of the agreement reached by the London 6-Power Conference, and the Czechoslovak coup d'état of 1948, convinced Western leaders that they had to take swift and decisive measures to strengthen the portions of Germany not occupied by the Soviets.

The US, British and French authorities also agreed to replace their military administrations in their occupation zones with High Commissioners operating within the terms of a three-power occupation statute. The Blockade also helped to unify German politicians in these zones in support of the creation of a West German state; some of them had hitherto been fearful of Soviet opposition. The blockade also increased the perception among many Europeans that the Soviets posed a danger, helping to prompt the entry into NATO of Portugal, Iceland, Italy, Denmark, and Norway.

It has been claimed that animosities between Germans and the Western Allies were greatly reduced by the airlift, with the former enemies recognising common interests. The Soviets refused to return to the Allied Control Council in Berlin, rendering the four-power occupation authority set up at the Potsdam Conference useless. It has been argued that the events of the Berlin Blockade are proof that the Allies conducted their affairs within a rational framework, since they were keen to avoid war.

Legacy

Debate and analysis

The blockade marked a crucial point in the Cold War, and Stalin took a calculated military risk; one which has been argued to alter the East and West relationship. The Berlin Airlift helped to secure the continued status of West Berlin as an Western enclave and greatly aided the narrative of the West during the Cold War. Reflecting on the blockade and airlift in, President Truman said:

There was only one way to avoid a third world war, and that was to lead from strength. We had to rearm ourselves and our allies and, at the same time, deal with the Russians in a manner they could never interpret as weakness.

Canadian historian Joseph Pearson has argued that Berlin was not completely sealed during the Berlin Airlift, as West Berlin citizens could get food in East Berlin:

The allied airlift cost the equivalent of almost $3bn today, and needed a persuasive narrative to win public support. It's one that almost everyone still believes today: Berlin was blockaded, its land routes sealed, and women and children were starving. Except, while there was an airlift of supplies, there was no Berlin blockade.

Further analysis is provided in Pearson's book, Sweet Victory, which explores the everyday history of the Airlift operation, focusing on the ease of civilian movement across zonal boundaries. This argument separates the airlift from the East German market collapse and 1948 Currency Reform that proceeded it.

Post-Cold War

In 2007, Tegel was joined by a re-developed Berlin-Schönefeld International Airport in Brandenburg. As a result of the development of these two airports, Tempelhof was closed in October 2008, while Gatow became home of the Bundeswehr Museum of Military History – Berlin-Gatow Airfield and a housing development. In October 2020, the expansion of Schönefeld into the larger Berlin Brandenburg Airport was completed, making Tegel mostly redundant as well.

Aircraft used in the Berlin Airlift

United States

Boeing C-97 Stratofreighter

Consolidated B-24 Liberator

Consolidated PBY Catalina

Douglas C-54 Skymaster and Douglas DC-4

Douglas C-74 Globemaster

Douglas C-47 Skytrain and Douglas DC-3

Fairchild C-82 Packet

Lockheed C-121A Constellation

In the early days, the Americans used their C-47 Skytrain or its civilian counterpart Douglas DC-3. These machines could carry a payload of up to 3.5 tons, but were replaced by C-54 Skymasters and Douglas DC-4s, which could carry up to 10 tons and were faster. These made up a total of 330 aircraft, which made them the most used types. Other American aircraft such as the five C-82 Packets, and the one YC-97A Stratofreighter 45-59595, with a payload of 20 tons—a gigantic load for that time—were only sparsely used.

British

Avro Lancaster

Avro Lincoln

Avro York

Avro Tudor

Avro Lancastrian

Bristol Type 170 Freighter

Douglas DC-3 (Dakota)

Handley Page Hastings

Handley Page Halifax Halton

Short Sunderland

Vickers VC.1 Viking

The British used a considerable variety of aircraft types. Many aircraft were either former bombers or civil versions of bombers. In the absence of enough transports, the British chartered many civilian aircraft. British European Airways (BEA) coordinated all British civil aircraft operations. Apart from BEA itself, the participating airlines included British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) and most British independent airlines of that era—e.g. Eagle Aviation, Silver City Airways, British South American Airways (BSAA), the Lancashire Aircraft Corporation, Airwork, Air Flight, Aquila Airways, Flight Refuelling Ltd (which used their Lancaster tankers to deliver aviation fuel), Skyways, Scottish Airlines and Ciro's Aviation.

Altogether, BEA was responsible to the RAF for the direction and operation of 25 British airlines taking part in "Operation Plainfare". The British also used flying boats, particularly for transporting corrosive salt. These included civilian aircraft operated by Aquila Airways. These took off and landed on water and were designed to be corrosion-resistant. Additionally, their roof-mounted control cables were protected against corrosion. In winter, when ice covered the Berlin rivers and made the use of flying boats difficult, the British used other aircraft in their place.

Altogether, a total of 692 aircraft were engaged in the Berlin Airlift, more than 100 of which belonged to civilian operators.