Battle of Iwo Jima

Background

After the American capture of the Marshall Islands and the air attacks against the Japanese fortress island of Truk Atoll in the Carolines in January 1944, Japanese military leaders reevaluated their strategic position. All indications pointed to an American drive toward the Mariana Islands and the Carolines. To counter such an offensive, the IJA and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) established an inner line of defenses extending generally northward from the Carolines to the Marianas, from there to Japan via the Volcano Islands, and westward from the Marianas via the Carolines and the Palau Islands to the Philippines.

In March 1944, the Japanese 31st Army, commanded by General Hideyoshi Obata, was activated to garrison this inner line. (Note that an army-sized unit in Imperial Japanese military doctrine was about the size of an American, British Army, or Canadian Army corps.)

The commander of the Japanese garrison on Chichi Jima was placed nominally in command of IJA and IJN units in the Volcano Islands. After the American conquest of the Marianas, daily bomber raids from the Marianas began to strike mainland Japan in Operation Scavenger. Iwo Jima served as an early warning station that radioed reports of incoming bombers back to the home islands, allowing Japanese air defenses to prepare for the arrival of American bombers.

After the U.S. seized bases in the Marshall Islands in the battles of Kwajalein and Eniwetok in February 1944, Japanese reinforcements were sent to Iwo Jima: 500 men from the naval base at Yokosuka and 500 from Chichi Jima reached Iwo Jima during March and April 1944. At the same time, with reinforcements arriving from Chichi Jima and the home islands, the army garrison on Iwo Jima reached a strength of more than 5,000 men. The loss of the Marianas during the summer of 1944 greatly increased the importance of the Volcano Islands for the Japanese, who were concerned that the loss of those islands would further facilitate American air raids against the home islands, disrupt war manufacturing, and severely damage civilian morale.

The final Japanese plans for the defense of the Volcano Islands were hamstrung by several factors:

The Combined Fleet had lost almost all of its striking power during naval engagements in the latter half of 1944, and could not interdict American landings.

Planning and preparation

Japanese preparations

In June 1944, Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi was assigned to command the defense of Iwo Jima. Kuribayashi knew that if the Americans decided to land on Iwo Jima, his garrison could not win the battle, but he hoped to inflict massive casualties on the American forces so that the United States, and its Australian and British allies, might reconsider carrying out an invasion of the Japanese home islands.

Drawing inspiration from Japanese defensive tactics used in the Battle of Peleliu, Kuribayashi designed a defensive strategy that broke with traditional Japanese military doctrine. Rather than establishing defenses on the beach to contest the landings directly, he opted for defenses in depth. Kuribayashi's troops constructed a complex system of mutually-supporting fortifications, often linked by a vast tunnel system, equipped with heavy machine guns and artillery. Takeichi Nishi's armored tanks were camouflaged and used as static artillery positions. Because the tunnel linking Mount Suribachi to the rest of the island was never completed, Kuribayashi organized the southern area of the island in and around the mountain as a semi-independent sector, with his main defensive zone built up in the north. The expected American naval and air bombardment prompted the creation of an extensive network of tunnels connecting otherwise disparate fighting positions, so that a pillbox that had been cleared could be later reoccupied. This network of bunkers and pillboxes was designed for protracted resistance. For instance, the Nanpo Bunker (Southern Area Islands Naval Air HQ) east of Airfield Number 2, had enough food, water, and ammunition for the Japanese to hold out for three months. The bunker was 90 feet underground with tunnels running in various directions. Approximately five hundred 55-gallon drums filled with water, kerosene, and fuel oil for generators were stored inside the complex. Gasoline-powered generators allowed for radios and lighting to be operated underground.

By the time the Americans invaded on 19 February 1945, 18 km (11 mi) of a planned 27 km (17 mi) of tunnels had been dug. Besides the Nanpo Bunker, there were numerous other command centers and barracks 75 feet below ground. Tunnels allowed for troops to move undetected between defensive positions. Hundreds of hidden artillery and mortar positions were placed all over the island, and many areas extensively mined. Among the Japanese weapons were 320 mm spigot mortars and a variety of explosive rockets. Nonetheless, the Japanese supply situation was inadequate. Troops were supplied 60% of the ammunition normally considered sufficient for single engagement by one division, and food for no more than four months.

Pre-landing bombardment

Major General Harry Schmidt, commander of the Marine landing force, requested a 10-day heavy bombardment of the island immediately preceding his planned amphibious assault. However, Rear Admiral William H. P. Blandy, commander of the Amphibious Support Force (Task Force 52), believed that such a bombardment would not allow him time to replenish his ships' ammunition before the landings; he thus refused Schmidt's request. Schmidt then asked for nine days of shelling; Blandy again refused and insisted upon a three-day bombardment. This decision was resented among the Marines in the landing force. After the war, Lieutenant General Holland M. "Howlin' Mad" Smith, commander of the Expeditionary Troops (Task Force 56, which consisted of Schmidt's Fifth Amphibious Corps), bitterly complained that a frequent lack of supporting naval gunfire had cost Marine lives throughout the Allied island-hopping campaign.

Each heavy warship was assigned an area on Iwo Jima to saturate with shells, ultimately covering the entire island. Each warship fired for approximately six hours before stopping for a certain amount of time. Poor weather on D-3 (three days before the landings) led to uncertain results for that day's bombardment. On D-2, the time and care that the Japanese had taken in preparing their artillery positions became clear. When heavy cruiser USS Pensacola got within range of Japanese shore batteries, the ship was quickly hit six times and suffered 17 dead. Later, 12 small craft attempting to land a UDT were all struck by Japanese fire and quickly retired. While aiding these vessels, the destroyer USS Leutze was also hit and suffered 7 dead. On D-1, Blandy's gunners were once again hampered by rain and clouds. Schmidt summed up his feelings by stating, "We only got about 13 hours worth of fire support during the 34 hours of available daylight."

The limited bombardment had a questionable impact on the enemy since the Japanese were heavily dug-in and well fortified. The craters left behind by the barrage also provided additional cover for the defenders, while hampering the attackers' advance. Despite this, many bunkers and caves were destroyed during the bombardment. The Japanese had been preparing for this battle since March 1944, which gave them a significant advantage. By the time of the landing, about 450 American ships were located off Iwo Jima, and the battle ultimately involved about 60,000 U.S. Marines and several thousand U.S. Navy Seabees.

Opposing forces

Japanese

21,060 total men under arms

Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi, commanding

Colonel Tadashi Takaishi, chief of staff

Army

109th Division

Navy

4 anti-aircraft defense units

First day – 19 February 1945

Amphibious landing

During the night of 18 February 1945, Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher's large carrier force, Task Force 58, arrived off Iwo Jima. Also in this flotilla was Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, the overall commander for the invasion, in his flagship USS Indianapolis. Smith was once again deeply frustrated that Mitscher's powerful carrier group had been bombing the Japanese home islands instead of softening the defenses of Iwo Jima. Mitscher's fliers did, however, assist the additional surface vessel bombardment that accompanied the launch of the amphibious landing craft toward the island.

Unlike many days during the three-day preliminary bombardment, D-Day dawned clear and bright. At 08:59, one minute ahead of schedule, the first wave of Marines landed on the beaches of the southeastern coast of Iwo Jima. Under Major Howard Connor, 5th Marine Division signal officer, six Navajo code talkers worked around the clock during the first two days of the battle. These six men sent and received over 800 messages, all without error. Connor later stated, "Were it not for the Navajos, the Marines would never have taken Iwo Jima."

Situation on the beaches

Unfortunately for the landing force, the planners at Pearl Harbor severely misjudged the situation that would face Schmidt's Marines. The beaches had been described as "excellent," and the thrust inland expected to be "easy." The apparent lack of a vigorous Japanese response to the landings led the Navy to conclude that its bombardment had effectively suppressed the Japanese defenses. The Marines initially began deployment on the beach in good order, but the landings swiftly became congested due to the loose volcanic ash covering the island. After allowing the Americans to concentrate men and materiel on the beach for just over an hour, throughout which they maintained cohesive fire discipline, the Japanese opened fire. Shortly after 10:00 machine guns, mortars, and heavy artillery began to rain down on the crowded beach.

At first it came as a ragged rattle of machine-gun bullets, growing gradually louder and fiercer until at last all the pent-up fury of a hundred hurricanes seemed to be breaking upon the heads of the Americans. Shells screeched and crashed, every hummock spat automatic fire and the very soil underfoot erupted with hundreds of exploding land mines ... Marines walking erect crumpled and fell. Concussion lifted them and slammed them down, or tore them apart ...Furthermore, after crossing the beach, the Marines were faced with 15 ft-high (4.6 m) slopes of soft black volcanic ash. This ash allowed for neither secure footing nor the construction of foxholes to protect the Marines from hostile fire. However, the ash did help to absorb some of the fragments from Japanese artillery.Marines were trained to move rapidly forward; here they could only plod. The weight and amount of equipment was a terrific hindrance and various items were rapidly discarded. First to go was the gas mask ...

The Japanese crews manning the heavy artillery in Mount Suribachi opened reinforced steel doors shielding their positions in order to fire, and then closed them immediately afterward to prevent counterfire from the Marines and USN gunners. This made it exceedingly difficult for American units to destroy a Japanese artillery piece. To make matters worse for the Americans, most bunkers were connected to the elaborate tunnel system running through most of the island. Bunkers cleared with flamethrowers and grenades were often reoccupied shortly afterwards by Japanese troops moving underground. This tactic caused many casualties among the Marines, as they walked past reoccupied bunkers without expecting to suddenly take fresh fire from them.

Moving off the beaches

Amtracs, unable to gain traction in the black ash, made no progress up the slopes dominating the beach; their Marine passengers had to dismount and slog forward on foot. Men of Naval Construction Battalions 31 and 133, braving enemy fire, were eventually able to bulldoze roads off of the beach. This allowed the Marines to finally make some progress inland and get off the beach, which had become overcrowded with both men and materiel as follow-on waves of landing craft continued to unload. Casualties on the beach were heavy, with historian Derrick Wright noting "in virtually every shell hole there lay at least one dead Marine."

By 11:30, some Marines had managed to reach the southern tip of Airfield No. 1, the seizure of which had been one of the original objectives for the first day. They repelled a fanatical charge by over 100 Japanese troops and were able to keep their toehold on Airfield No. 1 as night fell.

Crossing the island

In the left-most sector of the landings, the Americans did manage to achieve one of their objectives for the battle that day. Led by Colonel Harry B. "Harry the Horse" Liversedge, the 28th Marines drove across the island at its narrowest width, around 800 m (870 yd), thereby isolating the Japanese dug in on Mount Suribachi.

Action on the right flank

The rightmost landing area was dominated by Japanese fortifications located at "the Quarry". The 25th Marine Regiment conducted a two-pronged attack to neutralize this position. 2nd Lieutenant Benjamin Roselle, part of a ground team directing naval gunfire, described the following experience:

Within a minute a mortar shell exploded among the group ... his left foot and ankle hung from his leg, held on by a ribbon of flesh ... Within minutes a second round landed near him and fragments tore into his other leg. For nearly an hour he wondered where the next shell would land. He was soon to find out as a shell burst almost on top of him, wounding him for the third time in the shoulder. Almost at once another explosion bounced him several feet into the air and hot shards ripped into both thighs ... as he lifted his arm to look at his watch a mortar shell exploded only feet away and blasted the watch from his wrist and tore a large jagged hole in his forearm: "I was beginning to know what it must be like to be crucified," he was later to say.

The 25th Marines' 3rd Battalion had landed approximately 900 men on the island that morning. Japanese resistance at the Quarry was so fierce that by nightfall, only 150 Marines were left in fighting condition, an 83.3% casualty rate.

By the evening of 19 February, 30,000 Marines had landed. About 40,000 more would follow. Aboard the command ship USS Eldorado, Smith saw the lengthy casualty reports and was briefed on the slow progress of the ground forces. To the war correspondents covering the operation, Smith remarked: "I don't know who he is, but the Japanese general running this show is one smart bastard."

Subsequent combat

In the days after the landings, the Marines expected the usual Japanese banzai charge during the night. This had been the standard Japanese defense strategy in previous island battles against enemy ground forces in the Pacific, such as what the US Army faced in the Battle of Saipan in June 1944. In those attacks, for which the Army Soldiers had usually been at least somewhat prepared, the majority of Japanese attackers had been killed and the overall Japanese fighting strength significantly degraded. However, General Kuribayashi had strictly forbidden these "human wave" attacks, considering them a futile waste of resources.

The fighting near the beachhead remained intense, and the American advance was stalled by numerous defensive positions augmented by artillery. Marines were frequently ambushed by Japanese troops who sprang out of previously-unseen tunnels. At night, the Japanese left their defenses in small groups to attack American foxholes under cover of darkness, and USN ships began firing star shells to illuminate the battlefield. Similar to previous battles on Japanese-held islands, Japanese soldiers who knew English were used to harass and deceive Marine units. English-speaking IJA troops often yelled "corpsman", pretending to be a wounded Marine, in order to lure and kill the USN medical personnel attached to Marine infantry companies.

The Marines learned that firearms were relatively ineffective against the Japanese defenders, and turned to flamethrowers and grenades to flush the Japanese troops out of their tunnels. One of the technological innovations of the battle, the eight Sherman M4A3R3 medium tanks equipped with a flamethrower ("Ronson" or "Zippo" tanks), proved highly effective at clearing hardened Japanese positions. The Shermans were difficult to disable, often requiring Japanese defenders to assault them in the open, where they were vulnerable to the superior numbers and firepower of the Marines.

Close air support was initially provided by fighters from escort carriers off the coast. This shifted over to the 15th Fighter Group, flying P-51 Mustangs, after they arrived on the island on 6 March. Similarly, illumination rounds (flares), used to light up the battlefield at night, were initially provided by ships but were later provided by land-based artillery. Navajo code talkers were part of the American ground communications system, along with walkie-talkies and SCR-610 backpack radio sets.

Raising the flag on Mount Suribachi

Raising the Flag on Iwo Jima is a black and white photograph taken by Joe Rosenthal depicting six Marines from E Company, 2nd Battalion, 28th Marines, raising a U.S. flag atop Mount Suribachi on 23 February 1945, the second of two flag-raisings on the site that day. The photograph was extremely popular, being reprinted in thousands of publications. Later, it became the only photograph to win the Pulitzer Prize for Photography in the same year as its publication, becoming one of the most significant and recognizable images of the war and possibly the most reproduced photograph of all time. The image was later used by Felix de Weldon to sculpt the 1954 Marine Corps War Memorial located adjacent to Arlington National Cemetery.

By the morning of 23 February, Mount Suribachi was effectively cut off above ground from the rest of the island. The Marines knew there was an extensive network of below-ground defenses, and that in spite of its isolation above ground, the volcano was still connected via the tunnel network. They expected a fierce fight for the summit. Two small patrols from two rifle companies of the 2/28 Marines were sent up the volcano to reconnoiter routes on the mountain's north face. The recon patrols made it to the summit and scrambled down again, reporting all enemy contacts to the 2/28 Marines commander, Lieutenant Colonel Chandler W. Johnson.

Popular accounts published by the press in the aftermath of the release of the photo of the flag raising had the Marines fighting all the way up to the summit. Although the riflemen expected an ambush, the larger patrol going up afterwards encountered only a few defenders once on top and after the flag was raised. The majority of the Japanese troops stayed in the tunnel network during shelling, only occasionally attacking in small groups, and were generally all killed.

Johnson called for a reinforced platoon-size patrol from E Company to climb Suribachi and seize and occupy the crest. The patrol commander, First Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier, was handed the battalion's American flag to be raised on top to signal Suribachi's capture, if they reached the summit. Johnson and the Marines anticipated heavy fighting, but the patrol encountered only a small amount of sniper fire on the way up the mountain. After the mountain top was secured by Schrier and his men, a length of Japanese water pipe was found among the wreckage; the American flag was attached to the pipe, then raised and planted atop Mount Suribachi, the first foreign flag to fly on Japanese soil. Photographs of the flag and some of the patrol members around it were taken by Marine photographer Louis R. Lowery, the only photographer who had accompanied Schrier's patrol up the mountain.

Northern Iwo Jima

Despite the loss of Mount Suribachi on the south end of the island, the Japanese still held strong positions on the north end. The rocky terrain vastly favored defense, even more so than Mount Suribachi, which was much more vulnerable to naval artillery fire. The fortifications on the northern section of Iwo Jima were also more impressive than those at the southern end of the island. Remaining under the command of Kuribayashi was the equivalent of eight infantry battalions, a tank regiment, and two artillery and three heavy mortar battalions. There were also about 5,000 gunners and naval infantry available for combat. The most arduous task left to the Marines was seizing the Motoyama Plateau, with its distinctive Hill 382 and "Turkey knob", as well as the area in between, referred to as "the Amphitheater". These obstacles formed the basis of what came to be known to the Marines as the "meatgrinder". While these Japanese positions were being reduced on the right flank, American units on the left were clearing out Hill 362 with just as much difficulty.

The Marines' overall objective at this point was to take control of Airfield No. 2 in the center of the island. However, every "penetration seemed to become a disaster" as "units were raked from the flanks, chewed up, and sometimes wiped out. Tanks were destroyed by interlocking fire or were hoisted into the air on the spouting fireballs of buried mines". As a result, the fighting bogged down, and American casualties piled up rapidly. Even capturing these points did not guarantee that the captured territory was secure, since a previously cleared fortification could be reoccupied by Japanese troops utilizing the island's tunnel system. As such, it was said that "[the Marines] could take these heights at will, and then regret it".

American troops observed that during bombardments, the Japanese would hide their guns and themselves in caves, only to reemerge when Marine units began to advance and lay down devastating fire on them. Over time, the Japanese learned basic American combat tactics, which usually involved laying down a heavy bombardment before an infantry attack. Consequently, Erskine ordered the 9th Marine Regiment to attack under cover of darkness with no preliminary barrage. This was a resounding success, with many Japanese soldiers killed while still asleep. This became a key moment in the capture of Hill 362. The hill held such strategic importance that the Japanese organized a counterattack to retake it the following night. Although Kuribayashi had forbidden the massed infantry charges often used by the Japanese in previous battles in the Pacific, the local IJA commander of the area decided on a banzai charge with the optimistic goal of recapturing Mount Suribachi.

Flamethrowers

The United States M2 flamethrower was heavily used in the Pacific. It features two tanks containing fuel and one of compressed gas, which are combined and ignited to produce a stream of flaming liquid out of the tip.

Flamethrowers were used to kill Japanese inside pillboxes, buildings and caves. A battalion would assign one flamethrower per platoon with one reserve flamethrower in each group. Flamethrower operators were usually in more danger than regular troops as the short range of their weapon required close combat, and the visibility of the flames on the battlefield made them a prominent target for snipers. Still, they were essential to breaking the dug-in enemy.

For better protection, flamethrowers were mounted on flame tanks, and one battalion commander called these the "best single weapon of the operation." Prior to Saipan the Marine Corps had left flamethrowing tank development to the Army. They had placed an order with the Army for nine tanks per division. At Schofield Barracks in Hawaii, Colonel Unmacht's top secret "Flame Thrower Group" located eight M4A3 Sherman medium tanks to convert for Operation Detachment. His Seabees, from the 117th CB, worked to combine the best features of three different flame units, the Ronson, the Navy model I and the Navy Mk-1, which soon led to the far better CB-H2. The U.S. Army Chemical Corps variously identified these tanks as POA-CWS-H1, (Pacific Ocean Area-Chemical Warfare Section-Hawaii) CWS-POA-H2, CWS-POA-H1 H2, OR CWS-"75"-H1 H2 mechanized flamethrowers. U.S. Marine and U.S. Army observer documents from Iwo Jima refer to them as the CB-Mk-1 or CB-H1. Marines on the lines simply called them the Mark I. The official USMC designation was "M4 A3R5". The Japanese referred to them as M1 tanks, and it is speculated that they did so because of a poor translation of "MH-1".

On Iwo Jima the flame tanks all landed on D-Day and went into action on D+2, sparingly at first. As the battle progressed, portable flame units wielded on foot sustained casualty rates up to 92%, leaving few troops trained to use the weapon. More and more calls came for the Mark-1 flame tanks, to the point that the Marines became dependent upon them and would hold up their assault until a flame tank was available. Since each tank battalion had only four, they were pooled among units and would dispatch from their respective refueling locations as the battle progressed. Towards the end of the battle, 5th Marine tanks expended between 5,000 to 10,000 US gal (19,000 to 38,000 L) of napalm per day.

Navajo Code Talkers

Navajo code talkers were a vital part of the U.S. Pacific campaign, and especially in the Battle of Iwo Jima. "Before the War Navajo boys were sent to a boarding school where Indians were taught to read, write and speak English. If they were caught speaking Navajo they would be punished. "This caused the United States to almost lose one of its secret weapons. When the Attack on Pearl Harbor happened in 1941 "The United States had been caught unprepared. In addition to being out-manned, outgunned and outsmarted in the early days of the war, the U.S. was also out-coded, as the Japanese forces had broken the coding system of the Pacific fleet."

This prompted the U.S. armed forces to search for new sources for codes. In 1942, Sergeant Phillip Johnson was assigned to direct the code training of Platoon 382 made up of Navajo men. "They were trained in sending and receiving messages from air to ground, ship to shore, tank to command post. Messages included missions and maneuvers, location and strength of the enemy, time and place of attack and other tactical orders." While on the Island of Iwo Jima, "Code Talkers acted as forward observers, calling in artillery strikes against positions that were causing the Marines problems. Code Talkers on land would radio positions to a command ship offshore, their messages then given to admirals and generals. A new strike plan would be drawn then the information transmitted back onto the shore all without being tapped by the Japanese, to whom such information would have proven decisive" "By the end of the battle, Billison and other Code Talkers had transmitted more than 800 messages error-free." These messages would be important information like new plans, or artillery barrages from the Navy Ships. Overall, the Navajo Code Talkers played a significant part in the U.S. success in the Pacific and Iwo Jima. There were only 28 non-Navajos who could speak the language, none of whom were German or Japanese. The Navajo language is challenging for speakers of European or East Asian languages to learn; and even if learned, it would be hard to imitate a native speaker. Japanese forces tried to bribe the Navajo to decipher the code, but they remained loyal to the United States.

Aftermath

Japanese holdouts on the island, including two of Lieutenant Toshihiko Ohno's men, Yamakage Kufuku [sic] (山蔭光福, Yamakage Kōfuku) and Matsudo Linsoki [sic] (松戸利喜夫, Matsudo Rikio), lasted four years without being caught, and finally surrendered on 6 January 1949.

The American victory at Iwo Jima had been extremely costly. According to the Navy Department Library, "the 36-day assault resulted in more than 26,000 American casualties, including 6,800 dead." By comparison, the much larger-scale 82-day Battle of Okinawa lasting from early April until mid-June 1945 (involving five U.S. Army and two Marine Corps divisions) resulted in over 62,000 U.S. casualties, of whom over 12,000 were killed or missing. Iwo Jima was also the only U.S. Marine battle where the American casualties exceeded those of the Japanese, although Japanese combat deaths numbered three times as many as American KIA. Two U.S. Marines were captured during the battle, neither of whom survived their captivity.

The USS Bismarck Sea was sunk during the battle, the last U.S. aircraft carrier sunk in World War II. 20 Grumman FM-2 Wildcat fighters and 11 Grumman TBM Avenger torpedo bombers went down with Bismarck Sea. The USS Saratoga was so severely damaged that she took no part in either combat or transportation duties for the rest of the war, and became a training ship for night fighter operations. 31 Grumman F6F Hellcat fighters and nine Grumman TBM Avenger torpedo bombers were destroyed by the kamikaze attack on Saratoga along with the loss of 132 men. Because all civilians had been evacuated, there were no civilian casualties on Iwo Jima, unlike at Saipan and Okinawa.

Strategic importance

In hindsight, given the number of casualties, the necessity and long-term significance of the island's capture to the outcome of the war became a contentious issue and remains disputed. The Marines, who conducted the landings and suffered the vast majority of the casualties, had not been consulted in the planning of the operation. As early as April 1945, retired Chief of Naval Operations William V. Pratt stated in Newsweek magazine that the "expenditure of manpower to acquire a small, God-forsaken island, useless to the Army as a staging base and useless to the Navy as a fleet base ... [one] wonders if the same sort of airbase could not have been reached by acquiring other strategic localities at lower cost."

The lessons learned on Iwo Jima served as guidelines for the Battle of Okinawa in April 1945, and influenced American planning for an invasion of the Japanese home islands. For example, on Okinawa, "because of the casualties taken at Iwo Jima on the first day, it was decided to make the preparatory bombardment the heaviest yet delivered on to a Pacific island". Additionally, in the planning for a potential invasion of Japan itself, it was taken into account that around a third of the troops committed to Iwo Jima, and later again at Okinawa, had been killed or wounded.

The justification behind Iwo Jima's strategic importance to the United States' war effort revolves around the island's role as a base for the P-51 Mustangs to serve as long-range fighter escorts for B-29 Superfortress bombers. In actual practice, these escorts proved both impractical and unnecessary, and only ten such missions were flown from Iwo Jima. The actual threat to American bombers from Japanese interceptor fighters continued to diminish, as all that remained in the Japanese inventory were mostly obsolete types, which was exacerbated by numerous quality control issues and fuel shortages as well as insufficient pilot training, and soon the Japanese were saving their remaining planes and fuel for kamikazes. By the time Iwo Jima had been captured, the bombing campaign against Japan had switched from daylight precision bombing to nighttime incendiary attacks, so fighter escorts were of limited utility. Starting in April 1945 and exclusively in July 1945, the P-51s based on Iwo Jima were repurposed from bomber escort to strike and interdiction missions. These raids were frequently made against airfields to destroy aircraft being held in reserve to attack the expected Allied invasion fleet if Operation Downfall commenced. Buildings, ships, and railway rolling stock were also targeted. Author J. Robert Moskin records that 1,191 fighter escorts and 3,081 strike sorties were flown from Iwo Jima against Japan. A more recent Air Force study found the contribution of VII Fighter Command, based on Iwo Jima, to be superfluous.

Naval vessels badly damaged

The following table lists for each ship badly damaged in the Battle of Iwo Jima, the dates they received hits, the cause, the type of ship, and the casualties inflicted during 17–28 February. The carrier USS Lunga Point, which received light damage, was listed because of the importance of escort carriers in the battle.

Medal of Honor recipients

The Medal of Honor is the highest military decoration awarded by the United States government. It is bestowed on a member of the United States Armed Forces who distinguishes himself by "... conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while engaged in an action against an enemy of the United States ..." Because of its nature, the medal is commonly awarded posthumously.

The Medal of Honor was awarded to 22 Marines (12 posthumously), and five were presented to sailors, four of whom were hospital corpsmen (two posthumously) attached to Marine infantry units. The medals awarded for the battle accounted for 28% of the 82 awarded to Marines in World War II.

At the time of his death on 29 June 2022, Marine Hershel W. Williams was the last living Medal of Honor recipient from World War II. He received his medal for actions in the Battle of Iwo Jima.

Legacy

The Marine Corps Iwo Jima Memorial was dedicated on 10 November 1954 at Arlington National Cemetery.

The USN has commissioned two ships with the name USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2) (1961–1993) and USS Iwo Jima (LHD-7) (2001–present).

The first large-scale reunion on the island was held in 1970 on the 25th anniversary of the battle. The event was sponsored by the Fifth Marine Division Association and included both American and Japanese veterans of the battle. Other notable attendees included then Brigadier General William K. Jones commander of the 3rd Marine Division and NBC’s senior correspondent in Asia John Rich. The widows of General Tadamichi Kuribayashi and Colonel Takeichi Nishi also attended events with American veterans held in Tokyo.

On 19 February 1985, the 40th anniversary of the landings on Iwo Jima, an event called the "Reunion of Honor" was held (the event has been held annually since 2002). Veterans of both sides of the battle attended the event, which is sited on the beach where U.S. forces landed. A memorial on which inscriptions were engraved by both sides was built at the center of the meeting place. Japanese attended at the mountain side, where the Japanese inscription was carved, and Americans attended at the shore side, where the English inscription was carved. After unveiling and offering of flowers were made, the representatives of both countries approached the memorial; upon meeting, they shook hands. The combined Japan-U.S. memorial service of the 50th anniversary of the battle was held in front of the monument in February 1995. Further memorial services have been held on later anniversaries.

The importance of the battle to Marines today is demonstrated in pilgrimages made to the island, and specifically the summit of Suribachi. Marines will often leave dog tags, rank insignia, or other tokens at the monuments in homage. Iwo Jima Day is observed annually on 19 February in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts with a ceremony at the State House.

The Japanese government continues to search for and retrieve the remains of Japanese military personnel who were killed during the battle.