Internal conflict
During his tenure, Uribe's declared priority was to contain or defeat the three main armed groups in Colombia, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), National Liberation Army (ELN), and FARC. And by the end of his first term in office the AUC had other right-wing militias agree to disarm and go to jail under special sentences of seven years.
Uribe stated that the government had to first show military superiority to eventually make the guerrillas return to the negotiating table with a more flexible position, even if this would only happen after his term in office expired. Early in his government, he was quoted as saying that Colombia's main concerns were the challenges of terrorism and the narcotics trade. In a dialog with BBC's Talking Point, Uribe stated: "Of course we need to eliminate social injustice in Colombia but what is first? Peace. Without peace, there is no investment. Without investment, there are no fiscal resources for the government to invest in the welfare of the people".
His security program was based on a policy of democratic security, aiming to:
Gradually restore police presence in all municipalities.
Increase judicial action against crimes of high social impact.
Strengthen public institutions.
Reduce human rights violations.
Dismantle terrorist organizations (especially armed rebel groups; the main one is the FARC-EP).
Reduce kidnappings and extortion.
Reduce homicide levels.
Prevent forced displacement and facilitating the return of forcefully-displaced people.
Continue to fight the illegal drug trade through interdiction, eradication and judicial action.
The policy intended to achieve these goals by:
Engaging the civilian population more actively.
Supporting soldiers.
Increasing intelligence capacity.
Reinstating control over national roads.
Demobilizing illegal groups.
Integrating the armed forces services.
Increasing defense spending.
In early 2002, Uribe's administration decreed a one-time tax of 1.2% of the liquid assets of the higher-income Colombians and corporations, with the goal of raising US$800 million. More than $650 million was collected before the final payment quota was made, surpassing original expectations. Another goal was to increase defense expenditures from a current level of about 3.6% of GDP to 6% of GDP by 2006. According to official government statistical information from August 2004, in two years, homicides, kidnappings, and terrorist attacks in Colombia decreased by as much as 50% – their lowest levels in almost 20 years. In 2003, there were 7,000 fewer homicides than in 2002 – a decrease of 27%. By April 2004, the government had established permanent police or military presence in every Colombian municipality for the first time in decades.
The Colombian Embassy in Washington states that, as a result of this policy, the Colombian armed forces would now have: "60% more combat-ready soldiers than four years ago; Helicopters which have significantly improved the mobility of the Armed Forces throughout the national territory; Attack helicopters ensuring the means to be more aggressive in the fight against FARC and AUC; Increased basic combat supplies, including rifles and ammunition; and [has received] significant less human rights complaints against them".
In January 2005, Human Rights Watch stated: "Paramilitary groups maintain close ties with a number of Colombian military units. The Uribe administration has yet to take effective action to break these ties by investigating and prosecuting high-ranking members of the armed forces credibly alleged to have collaborated with paramilitary groups. Credible reports indicate that some of the territories from which the military has ejected the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionarias de Colombia, FARC) are now under the control of paramilitary groups, which continue to carry out indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population".
A February 2005 report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the year 2004 stated: "Achievements and advances were observed in the field of human rights and international humanitarian law; however, there were also difficulties and contradictions. ... Progress was recorded in terms of prevention and protection, including strengthening of the mechanism of community defenders and the early warning system, as well as regarding the Ministry of the Interior's programs for the protection of vulnerable groups. Weaknesses persisted in the Government's responses to warnings, as well as in decreasing risk factors for vulnerable groups. The Government adopted positive measures regarding the destruction of stored anti-personnel mines. The armed forces occasionally carried out operations in which they failed to observe humanitarian principles".
An anti-terror statute criticized by many human rights groups was approved by Congress on 11 December 2003 but was struck down in August 2004 by the Colombian Constitutional Court during its review. The statute granted the military judicial police rights and allowed limited arrests and communication intercepts without warrants. It was struck down due to an error in the approval procedure, an objection the court has also presented towards other bills.
After some of the AUC's main leaders had declared a cease-fire and agreed to concentrate in Santa Fe de Ralito, several paramilitary demobilizations began in earnest, thousands of their "rank and file" fighters were disarmed and incorporated into government rehabilitation programs late in 2004. The main AUC leaders, who would be held responsible for atrocities, remained in the concentration zone and continued talks with the government's High Commissioner for Peace, Luis Carlos Restrepo. A number of the paramilitary members who initially demobilized in Medellín apparently did not actually belong to the AUC and this caused public concern. The AUC commanders claimed, as the year ended, that they had difficulties controlling all of their personnel from their isolated position, that they had already demobilized some 20% of their forces, and that they would await for the drafting of the necessary legal framework before making any more significant moves.
In 2005, Uribe and Colombia's congressmen prepared for the elections held in May and March 2006 respectively. FARC, which had been perceived as relatively passive, began to show signs of what analysts considered renewed vigor in February. It made a series of attacks against small military units, which left at least three dozen casualties. Uribe said in a speech that FARC remained strong and had never retreated, and he credited Colombia's soldiers for previous successes against FARC activities.
Negotiations with the AUC also increased public anxiety. Discussions continued about the legal provisions to assure "justice, reparation and truth" after a full demobilization. Also according to many observers, paramilitary activity continued despite AUC's declared cease-fire, albeit at a reduced rate. The demobilizations were renewed in November and finished in the complete disbandment of the group by middle February 2007, although some of the paramilitary units rejected disbandment and returned to criminal activity. These groups became known as the Black Eagles. This group is relatively small in comparison to the AUC and have not been able to achieve the notoriety or the military power of their predecessor, but are present on some former paramilitary areas, like Catatumbo and Choco.
The Colombian Congress agreed to prosecute AUC leaders under the controversial Justice and Peace Law, by which the paramilitary leaders would receive reduced sentences in exchange for their testimony and declarations of their entire criminal activity: links with drug dealers, assassinations, disappearances and massacres. These declarations are to be brought before a specialized judge, in a public hearing attended by the victims. The paramilitary leaders are also forced to "repair" the damage caused to the victims or their families: By disclosing the location of mass graves and by repaying each of them through economic assistance. As of 2008, these public hearings are still underway.
To improve its results in the fight against guerrilla warfare, the Colombian army carried out mass executions of civilians transformed into false positives. If exactions of this kind already existed, the phenomenon became widespread from 2002, encouraged by the bonuses paid to the soldiers and by quasi-absolute impunity. In 2010 a mass grave containing 2,000 corpses was discovered near a military base in the department of Meta. This is the largest mass grave discovered to date in South America.
In 2008, the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances of the United Nation's Human Rights Council criticised the continuation of forced disappearances in Colombia. According to the CODHES human rights NGO, forced displacement during Uribe's term affected over 2.4 million Colombian nationals by the end of 2009. A spokesperson for the organization stated: "It's true that there have been advances for some segments of society, but not for everyone, which casts into doubt the democratic component of (the government's) security policy". From 2000 to 2008, more than 130.000 Colombian nationals fled to Ecuador. According to the International Displacement Monitoring Centre, an estimated total of 3.303.979 to 4.915.579 people have been internally displaced in Colombia.
