James Martin Fitzgerald

This case is a declaratory judgment action brought by Allstate Insurance Company against its policyholders, the Roelfs family, and the parent of two minor girls who were sexually assaulted by the Roelfs' teenage son. Allstate sought summary judgment that its homeowners policy did not obligate it to defend or indemnify the Roelfs against state-court claims for assault, battery, punitive damages, and parental negligence. The court granted Allstate's motion and denied the opposing motion, ruling that the policy provided no coverage. The core reasoning was that the policy excludes coverage for bodily injury intentionally caused by an insured, and intent to injure is inferred as a matter of law from the character of sexual assault and molestation of minors, making the son's subjective intent irrelevant and barring coverage for both the direct claims and the related negligence claims against the parents.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned the effect of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) of 1971 and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976 on the continued operation of older federal townsite laws in Alaska, specifically for lands that had been segregated for townsites and surveyed before those acts but remained vacant and unsubdivided afterward. Native village corporations argued that ANCSA ended the townsite laws for such vacant lands, while traditional village councils contended that ANCSA left the laws intact but FLPMA barred new claims after 1976; the Secretary of the Interior maintained that ANCSA had no effect but FLPMA prevented new entries. The court granted summary judgment to the federal defendants, holding that the Secretary’s interpretations of both statutes were reasonable.

propertyfederal power

This case involved challenges by unions and individual employees of the Alaska Marine Highway System (AMHS) to a state law requiring cost-of-living wage differentials that paid Alaska-resident AMHS workers more than nonresidents. The plaintiffs argued that the differentials violated the Commerce Clause, Equal Protection Clause, Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the right to travel under the Fourteenth Amendment. The U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska granted summary judgment to the state defendants, upholding the statute. The court reasoned that the differentials were justified by Alaska's higher cost of living and the state's interest in encouraging residency among employees who operate a critical public transportation system, satisfying the substantial-reason test under privileges and immunities analysis without unduly burdening interstate commerce or other rights.

labor & employmentcivil rightsfederal power

In United States v. Campbell, the defendant was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute after approximately one pound of the drug was discovered in his luggage during a search at the Anchorage airport pursuant to a warrant. Campbell moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that his initial questioning and detention, the detention of his luggage for a dog sniff, the lack of Miranda warnings, and actions by Alaska state officers violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights as well as Alaska law. The court denied the motion, holding that the initial encounter was consensual and did not implicate the Fourth Amendment, that subsequent questioning amounted to a permissible Terry stop supported by reasonable suspicion, that Miranda warnings were not required because Campbell was not in custody, and that any state law issues did not bar admissibility in federal court. The ruling relied on precedents such as Florida v. Royer and United States v. Little to conclude that the officers' conduct was constitutional.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Pan Alaska Trucking sued the Teamsters union, SeaLand, and individual truck owners, alleging violations of federal antitrust laws under the Sherman and Clayton Acts based on claims that the defendants conspired in 1981 to demand higher truck lease fees, orchestrate boycotts and diversions of business, and ultimately force Pan Alaska out of operations. The defendants moved to dismiss the antitrust count, arguing that their conduct was protected by statutory and nonstatutory labor exemptions from antitrust liability. The court denied the motions to dismiss, holding that the alleged agreements involved non-labor parties and sought higher payments for equipment rather than wages or working conditions, producing anticompetitive effects that did not naturally follow from legitimate labor activities. The exemptions were narrowly construed and did not apply on the facts alleged in the complaint.

business & regulatorylabor & employment

The case involves Teamster unions and members suing oil companies for allegedly conspiring to fix rates for truck transportation to Alaska's North Slope and to boycott union-affiliated carriers, in violation of the antitrust laws and RICO. On motions to dismiss the antitrust claims, the court held that the plaintiffs could prove no set of facts entitling them to relief. The decision rested on the Supreme Court's ruling in Associated General Contractors v. Carpenters, which imposed limits on antitrust standing that the union plaintiffs could not satisfy. The RICO claims were reserved for separate resolution.

business & regulatorylabor & employment

This case concerns Mary Olympic's appeal of an Interior Board of Land Appeals decision denying her request to reinstate and amend her deceased father's 1960 Native allotment application under the Alaska Native Allotment Act, which had been rejected in 1967 due to an incorrect land description. Olympic sought to correct the description to match the land her father had actually used and occupied, arguing that the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) § 905 permitted such amendments even for heirs of deceased applicants whose claims were not finally resolved before the 1971 repeal of the Allotment Act by ANCSA. The court granted Olympic's motion for summary judgment and reversed the IBLA, holding that ANILCA § 905(c) allows heirs to amend erroneous land descriptions to fulfill the intent of the original applicant, as both the Allotment Act and ANILCA must be liberally construed to benefit Alaska Natives and promote allotment finality. The court rejected the government's arguments limiting amendments to living applicants and remanded the case to the Department of the Interior to permit the amendment and adjudicate the application under ANILCA.

propertycivil rightsfederal power

The case concerned Alaska Limestone Corporation's unpatented limestone mining claims in Mt. McKinley National Park, which were recorded before Congress withdrew the area from mineral entry in 1976 under the Mining in the Parks Act. That statute required the Secretary of the Interior to determine the validity of such claims within two years and report to Congress, but the deadline was missed; the Bureau of Land Management nonetheless initiated a contest proceeding challenging the claims' validity on marketability grounds. An administrative law judge found the claims invalid after a hearing, a decision upheld on appeal by the Interior Board of Land Appeals. The court denied Alaska Limestone's motion for summary judgment and granted the government's, holding that the missed statutory deadline did not divest the Secretary of authority to contest the claims and that substantial evidence supported the finding of invalidity due to lack of a reasonable market.

environmentbusiness & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case involved the United States seeking damages from Tom-Kat Development, Inc., for alleged violations of the Clean Water Act during its placer mining operations near Ferry, Alaska, specifically for discharging pollutants without a required National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. Tom-Kat moved for summary judgment on liability and damages, arguing that the Act created only a discretionary duty for permits and that its good-faith efforts to obtain one shielded it from liability; the government cross-moved on liability. The court denied Tom-Kat's motion, holding that the Clean Water Act imposes strict liability for unpermitted discharges from point sources into navigable waters and that applications for permits do not provide ongoing protection from enforcement after the limited 1974 statutory shield expired. The court also confirmed the EPA's standing to bring the suit under the Act's enforcement provisions, rejecting arguments that permit applications divested such authority.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

Marathon Oil Company held a working interest in Alaska oil and gas leases and paid royalties to the United States, the State of Alaska, and Cook Inlet Region, Inc. A dispute arose over the valuation method for royalties on gas delivered to an LNG plant and sold in Japan; after a 1981 settlement agreement adopting the Phillips formula tied to Japanese sales prices, the Minerals Management Service later ordered revised computations to reflect updated costs and prices. Marathon appealed the order, arguing that the settlement barred redetermination and that it could revert to an earlier contract-price basis, while the government maintained authority to adjust valuations under the leases and statutes. The court reviewed the administrative record, lease terms, settlement language, and statutory provisions governing federal royalties to resolve challenges to the agency's actions and Marathon's payment obligations.

business & regulatoryfederal power

In Lee v. United States, individuals who staked homestead claims in Alaska during the 1950s sued the federal government, BLM officials, and native corporations after portions of their entries were rejected due to a Power Site Classification and the lands were later patented to native entities under ANCSA. The plaintiffs sought to quiet title to the disputed lands or recover damages for inverse condemnation, relying on federal-question jurisdiction, mandamus, the Quiet Title Act, the APA, and various ANCSA provisions. The court dismissed the consolidated actions for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, holding that QTA claims were barred by the 12-year statute of limitations, ANCSA section 22(b) challenges were untimely under the Act's limitations provision, and other theories did not confer jurisdiction. One claim by Lee was excepted from dismissal.

propertyfederal powerprocedure

This case involved an appeal from a bankruptcy court's dismissal with prejudice of involuntary bankruptcy petitions filed by the State of Alaska against Alaska Oil Co. and Charter Oil (Alaska), Inc., which stemmed from a contract dispute over the purchase of the state's North Slope royalty oil. Appellants moved for the district judge's recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455, claiming that the judge's receipt of Alaska Permanent Fund dividends gave him a financial interest in the outcome since state recoveries could increase the fund. The court denied the recusal motion, holding that any such interest was shared equally with the public at large, was too remote to constitute a disqualifying financial interest or other substantially affected interest under the statute, and that requiring recusal in the many cases potentially touching the fund would impair the effective functioning of the federal court in Alaska.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a 1983 land exchange agreement in which the Secretary of the Interior transferred a portion of St. Matthew Island, a designated wilderness area within the Alaska Maritime National Wildlife Refuge, to three Alaska Native corporations in return for other land interests, with the goal of enabling oil exploration support facilities in the Navarin Basin. Environmental groups led by the National Audubon Society sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the exchange violated the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA). The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, holding that the Secretary abused the discretion granted under ANILCA § 1302(h) in approving the exchange. The core reasoning was that the administrative record showed the transaction failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for such exchanges, including proper valuation and compatibility with refuge purposes.

environmentfederal powerpropertybusiness & regulatory

In DeLong v. United States, civilian employees at a naval station sued the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act after marine guards, unaware of their authorized access, detained and allegedly assaulted them, seeking compensation for intentional torts and for separate negligence by other personnel in failing to notify the guards. The court addressed the government's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, focusing on exceptions in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) for claims arising from assault, battery, false imprisonment, or false arrest. It dismissed the intentional tort claim because the guards were not "investigative or law enforcement officers" empowered by statute to execute searches, seize evidence, or make arrests. However, it denied dismissal of the negligence claim, reasoning that it could proceed as a distinct basis for liability under the FTCA even if connected to an intentional tort, with duty and breach issues to be resolved at trial under state law.

torts & liabilityprocedurefederal power

The case challenged Secretary of the Interior James Watt's approval of Lease Sale No. 70, which opened nearly 2.7 million acres in Alaska's St. George Basin for oil and gas exploration and development. Plaintiffs, including villages, fishing groups, and environmental organizations, sought to block the sale due to threats to marine mammals, fish, birds, and endangered whale species from drilling, spills, and seismic activity. The court reviewed compliance with the Endangered Species Act, noting biological opinions that identified jeopardy to whales and gaps in necessary data. It held that formal consultation with the National Marine Fisheries Service must occur at the exploration stage, including for seismic activities, because the lease approval did not adequately address protections for known endangered populations or uncertainties in impacts.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved the United States filing an in rem forfeiture action against the Japanese vessel Marunaka Maru No. 88 and its catch after the Coast Guard seized the vessel inside the Fishery Conservation Zone for alleged violations of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, including fishing without a permit. The vessel owner moved to dismiss, contending that the court never obtained jurisdiction because the clerk had not issued an arrest warrant and the vessel had been released on bond and returned to Japan. The court explained that in rem jurisdiction over a vessel normally requires formal arrest under the Supplemental Admiralty Rules, but a claimant may waive strict compliance by posting a special release bond that expressly consents to the court's continuing jurisdiction and agrees to return the vessel if ordered. The court therefore addressed whether the bond filed by the owner preserved jurisdiction despite the lack of process.

procedurefederal powerenvironmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved seamen employed on vessels in offshore drilling operations who were not paid wages for their final two weeks of work and sued in admiralty court to recover those wages plus penalties under both 46 U.S.C. § 596 and Alaska Statute 23.05.140. The court granted summary judgment for the unpaid wages and for penalties under the Alaska statute but denied penalties under the federal statute. It reasoned that § 544 exempts coastwise trade vessels from the federal penalty provision, but the state penalty law is compatible with federal maritime law, does not impair any substantial admiralty rights, and does not contravene congressional intent to treat coastwise seamen like other workers.

labor & employmentfederal power

In this case, the Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope and related plaintiffs sought to quiet title and assert sovereign rights based on aboriginal title and historical use of sea ice over large portions of the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas beyond the three-mile limit, challenging federal oil and gas leases from 1979 and seeking damages, injunctive relief, and declarations of title. The defendants, including the United States and oil companies, moved for judgment on the pleadings. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the plaintiffs' claims of sovereignty and title over the outer continental shelf were inconsistent with established Supreme Court precedent recognizing the paramount rights of the federal government in ocean waters seaward of the low-water mark as an essential element of national sovereignty. The decision relied on cases such as United States v. California and United States v. Maine, rejecting distinctions based on native status and noting that property claims follow sovereignty in this context.

federal powerpropertycivil rights

The case involves the Municipality of Anchorage and its telephone utility suing Hitachi Cable, Ltd. for damages stemming from a bribery scheme in which Hitachi allegedly paid municipal employees to obtain confidential bid information and secure cable supply contracts through rigged competitive bidding from 1970 to 1978. The Municipality asserted federal claims under the Sherman Act, RICO, and the Robinson-Patman Act (section 2(c) prohibiting commercial bribery), along with pendent state law claims. Hitachi moved to dismiss the Robinson-Patman claim for lack of standing, arguing only competitors could sue, while the Municipality sought summary judgment on its federal claims. The court analyzed the bidding system's vulnerability to rigging, the nature of the payments as compensation for services not rendered, and the substance of the transactions, concluding that the Municipality had standing under section 2(c) because the bribery undermined fiduciary duties in the sale of goods; it also addressed related RICO and Sherman Act issues without dismissing for standing and referenced a corporate guilty plea in a parallel criminal matter.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerned whether a non-judicial foreclosure sale under a deed of trust counts as a 'transfer' for purposes of the one-year lookback period in the fraudulent transfer provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court ruled that it does not, and the district court affirmed. The court held that under 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(1) and Ninth Circuit precedent, the transfer occurred when the deed of trust was recorded and perfected under Alaska law, which happened more than a year before the bankruptcy filing. Because the recording date fell outside the statutory window, the foreclosure could not be avoided as a fraudulent transfer.

propertyprocedure