Frozen asset seizure
On 26 February 2010, the Thai Supreme Court was scheduled to render its verdict on whether to seize Thaksin's Thai assets, worth 76 billion baht frozen by the AEC after the coup. The AEC froze the assets under the authority of Announcement No. 30 of the military junta. Tensions ran high throughout Thailand. Tens of thousands of government security forces were deployed, particularly in routes leading to Bangkok. However, the UDD denied that it would rally on the date of the verdict. The nine Supreme Court judges had to make a judgment on accusations of abnormal wealth through policy corruption. Policy corruption, was defined by the court as the abuse of powers by implementing economic policies that, while in themselves legal and of potential benefit to society and the economy, also aided companies that were owned in part by the policy maker. The prosecution claimed that Thaksin abused his powers five times while premier.
The court first ruled that Thaksin and Potjaman were the real owners of the assets, rather than his children and relatives. The court also ruled that it had the authority to seize assets, based on the announcements of the junta. The court found Thaksin guilty of four out of five policy corruption, and ordered that 46 billion baht be seized. The remaining 30 billion was to remain frozen.
Count 1: Conversion of telecom concession fees into excise charges. Previously, telecom operators had to pay TOT/CAT a percentage of their revenue as a concession fee (TOT/CAT are state-owned enterprises, although they were going through the process of privatisation). The Thaksin government modified this into a system wherein all operators would instead directly pay the government an equivalent excise tax. The imposition of excise tax here would eventually be passed on to consumers. Thaksin claimed that all operators continued to pay the same total costs. The judges ruled that this benefited AIS while harming TOT, and thus was an abuse of power.
Count 2: Modification of a revenue sharing agreement on pre-paid mobile services. Previously, telecom operators had to pay TOT a percentage of their revenues for post-paid mobile services. To offer pre-paid services, which generally cost the consumer less, AIS negotiated with TOT to design a revenue sharing agreement for pre-paid services that offered less revenue to TOT, an estimated loss of 14.2 billion baht (revenue reduced from 25 to 20 percent) from 2001 to 2006 and another estimated loss of 56 billion baht (revenue reduced from 30 to 20 percent) from 2006 to 2015. The judges ruled that the terms of the pre-paid agreement harmed TOT while benefiting AIS. The judges did not dispute the fact that TOT's total revenue actually increased substantially as a result of the agreement, but noted that the rise in pre-paid revenue came about while harming TOT's post-paid revenue. The massive growth in Thai mobile penetration from 13 percent in 2001 to 80 percent in 2007, due almost completely to pre-paid services, and the reduction in AIS market share from 68 to 53 percent in the same period were not taken into account by the court.
Count 3: Modification of mobile roaming agreement. Previously, there were no roaming agreements between mobile operators – subscribers from one operator were not allowed to use services on another operator's network, thus limiting the growth of the mobile industry. Under the Thaksin government, roaming was allowed, with roaming fees deducted from the revenue that AIS and other operators had to share with TOT and other state enterprises. Essentially, TOT helped AIS shoulder the costs of its subscribers roaming on the mobile networks of other operators. This reduced TOT and CAT's income while benefiting the operators. However, the judges ruled that it while benefited AIS, it did so to the benefit of AIS's new owners (Temasek Holdings) rather than Thaksin, and hence was not an abuse of power.
Count 4: Replacement of ThaiCom 4 with iPSTAR. A previous government had originally contracted with ShinSat to launch and operate ThaiCom 4 as a backup satellite for ThaiCom 3. Instead, ShinSat negotiated with the Thaksin government to launch iPSTAR, at the time the largest commercial satellite in history, which it claimed could offer commercial internet services while also providing backup for ThaiCom 3. However, the claim is not technically possible since iPSTAR does not have C-band transponders as Thaicom 3. Shin Corp's ownership in ShinSat was subsequently reduced from 51% to 40%. The judges found that the changes in ownership and satellite specification change reduced Thailand's communications security by not having the backup satellite for ThaiCom 3 on the one-to-one basis. It also noted that the negotiations allowed ShinSat to launch a satellite with much greater commercial potential than ThaiCom 4 without having to bid for a separate concession agreement.
Count 5: EXIM Bank loan to Myanmar to pay for ThaiCom services. Thaksin was scheduled to meet with Burmese leaders to negotiate trade deals between the two countries. One of the deals negotiated gave Myanmar a Thai EXIM Bank loan to purchase 376 million baht in satellite services from ShinSat. Thaksin noted that many deals were struck in the negotiations, and that 16 other companies also benefited from the EXIM Bank's loans. The judges ruled that the loans gave preferential treatment to Thaksin, and hence were an abuse of power.
The judges decided to seize 46 billion differences in value of Shin Corp. shares from the date when he came to office and the value when the shares were sold to Singapore's Temasek Holdings in early 2006. Note that, Thaksin had declared around 500 million baht in assets and Pojaman had 8 billion to 9 billion baht while Thaksin served as prime minister. Nevertheless, during that period, Shin shares gained 121%, compared with a 128% gain in the benchmark SET index, while Siam Cement, one of Thailand's premier blue chip companies, gained 717%. The judges did not find that Thaksin was guilty of malfeasance. They also noted that any benefit to the government from Thaksin's policies was irrelevant to the ruling. The government reaped approximately 100 billion baht in increased revenue from changes in the concession agreements alone.
In an email to his supporters, Thaksin claimed that the court was used as a tool. He also noted how the Thai stock market rose to the benefit of many companies, not just his, and claimed that all charges against him were politically motivated. He thanked his supporters for not protesting while the verdict was being read, and implored them to use non-violent means in the future. Pojaman na Pombejra insisted that tens of billions of baht of her wealth had been given to her children and relatives well before Thaksin took office in 2001 and denied that her children and relatives were nominees of her and her husband. She also denied having any control over Ample Rich and Win Mark, two firms that the AEC had accused of being her nominees. In spite of Pojaman's claim, Thaksin was the authorised signature for Ample Rich through 2005, making him the only individual authorised to withdraw funds from the company's account until he transferred the authority to his children, four years after he took office in 2001.
Some UDD members held a small protest in front of the court, but did not disrupt the ruling as the government had predicted they would. The UDD leaders announced that a large-scale protest was scheduled to be held on 14 March 2010.
On the evening of 27 February, M67 grenades were thrown from a motorcycle outside three branches of Bangkok Bank. Nobody was hurt or injured in the attacks. The perpetrators were not caught, and no organisation claimed responsibility for the attacks. Thaksin and the UDD were quick to deny any involvement. An arrest warrant was issued based on sketches of a motorcycle driver.
